Author
Abstract
[fre] Les économistes ont souvent recours à la notion de confiance pour justifier, en dépit de l'incomplétude contractuelle, l'engagement des agents dans des relations de coopération. Cependant, au sein de la littérature économique aujourd'hui très développée consacrée à la confiance, cette notion revêt un caractère polysémique. Nous discernons deux grandes définitions de la confiance, qui reposent sur des hypothèses de motivation des agents très différentes. La première définition, la confiance au sens 1, retient de la théorie néoclassique standard la vision d'un individu engagé dans la quête égoïste de son intérêt personnel. Dans cette perspective, confiance et méfiance sont paradoxalement tout à fait compatibles. La pertinence de l'emploi du terme de confiance peut alors être discutée. La seconde définition, la confiance au sens 2, repose sur une vision différente des motivations des individus. Cette définition est élaborée en référence à d'autres disciplines. Nous montrons que l'intégration de cette confiance au sens 2 dans l'analyse microéconomique trouve des limites aussi bien théoriques qu'empiriques. Par conséquent, le statut de la confiance en économie est loin d'être fermement scellé. [eng] Economists often use the notion of trust in order to justify, in spite of contractual incompleteness, agents commitment in cooperative relationships. However in the bosom of economic literature devoted to trust, this notion is polysemic. We discern two large definitions of trust, which are lying on very different motivational hypothesises concerning the agents. The first definition, i.e. trust in a first meaning, is akin to standard theory. The agents are motivated by the pursuit of their self-interest. In this perspective, trust and mistrust are paradoxically compatible. Then, the use of the notion of trust is a subject for discussion. The second definition, i.e. trust in a second meaning, involves a different view about agents' motivations. This definition is set up in reference to other social sciences. We show that the integration of trust in its second sense comes on theoretical and empirical snags. Consequently, the status of trust in economics is far from being firmly sealed.
Suggested Citation
Pascal Billand, 1998.
"Rationalité et coopération : le rôle de la confiance en économie,"
Revue d'Économie Industrielle, Programme National Persée, vol. 84(1), pages 67-84.
Handle:
RePEc:prs:recind:rei_0154-3229_1998_num_84_1_1716
DOI: 10.3406/rei.1998.1716
Note: DOI:10.3406/rei.1998.1716
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