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La gestion du risque dépendance : le rôle de la famille, de l'État et du secteur privé

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  • Pascale Genier

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[fre] La gestion du risque dépendance : le rôle de la famille, de l'État et du secteur privé . Même si la prise en charge publique de la dépendance n'est pas négligeable, l'essentiel de la couverture de ce risque repose encore sur la solidarité familiale. Les évolutions socio-démographiques actuelles font apparaître les limites de cette aide bénévole et soulignent ainsi l'intérêt d'une mutualisation plus large du risque de dépendance. . Face à ce besoin, le recours à l'assurance privée ne pourra constituer qu'une solution partielle. En effet, la crainte de comportements opportunistes de la part des assurés ainsi que le risque de dérive du coût de la prise en charge incitent les assureurs à n'offrir que des couvertures limitées, qui restent malgré tout trop onéreuses pour une large frange de la population. . Les contraintes financières comme les considérations d'efficacité interdisent certainement l'idée d'une couverture complète par le secteur public qui évincerait totalement la famille et le secteur privé. Mais une rationalisation sinon un élargissement de la couverture existante semblent souhaitables. De nombreux choix doivent être effectués, dont on rappelle les implications : prestations en nature contre prestations en espèces, universalité contre sélectivité, modalités de gestion et d'attribution des prestations. Enfin, au-delà de ses responsabilités en matière d'assurance sociale, l'État a un rôle important à jouer dans la régulation de l'ensemble de l'offre. [spa] La gestion del riesgo de dependencia : el papel de la familia, del Estado y del sector privado . Aunque no se puede mesestimar la garantia pûblica de la dependencia, lo esencial de la cobertura de este riesgo descansa en la solidaridad familiar. Las evoluciones sociodemogrâficas actuales ponen de manifiesto los limites de esta ayuda benévola, y subrayan el interés de una mutualizaciôn mâs amplia del riesgo de dependencia. . Frente a esta carencia, el recurso al seguro privado solo podrâ representar una solution parcial. De hecho, el miedo a comportamientos oportunistas de parte de los asegurados, asi como el riesgo de dériva del coste de la garantia incitan a que los aseguradores no ofrezcan sino coberturas limitadas, que siguen siendo a pesar de todo onerosas para gran parte de la poblaciôn. . Los obstâculos financieros y el afân de eficacia prohiben la idea de una cobertura compléta por el sector pûblico que élimine por complete a la familia y al sector privado. Pero es de desear una rationalization, o una ampliation de la cobertura existente. Hay que tomar varias decisiones, de las que recordamos las consecuencias : prestaciones en especie contra prestaciones en efectivo, universalidad contra selectividad, modalidades de gestion y de atribuciôn de las prestaciones. En fin, ademâs de sus responsabilidades en cuanto a seguro social, el Estado tiene un papel relevante que desempenar en la regulaciôn de la totalidad de la oferta. [ger] Die Absicherung des Risikos der Pfiegebedurftigkeit: die Rolle der Familie, des Staates und des Privatsektors . Wenn auch die ôffentliche Hand bei der Versorgung pflegebedûrftiger Menschen eine nicht unerhebliche Rolle spielt, stutzt sich die Absicherung dieses Risikos nach wie vor hauptsâchlich auf die Solidaritât der Familie. Die gegenwàrtigen soziodemographischen Entwicklungen zeigen die Grenzen dieser unentgeltlichen Hilfe auf und verdeutlichen den Nutzen einer grôBeren Kollektivierung des Risikos der Pfiegebedurftigkeit. . Vor diesem Hintergrund kann die private Versicherung lediglich eine Teillôsung darstellen; denn die Furcht vor opportunistischen Verhaltensweisen der Versicherten sowie das Risiko eines Uberhandnehmens der Pflege- kosten veranlassen die Versicherer, nur eine begrenzte Absicherung anzubieten, die trotz allem fur einen GroBteil der Bevôlkerung nach wie vor zu teuer ist. . Finanzielle Sachzwânge wie auch Effizienzgrûnde schlieBen sicherlich eine vollstândige Absicherung durch den ôffentlichen Sektor aus, zumal die Familie und der private Sektor dadurch vôllig verdràngt wûrden. Eine Rationalisierung Oder andernfalls eine Erweiterung der bestehenden Absicherung scheint nichtsdestoweniger wûnschenswert. Hierbei muB zwischen verschiedenen Optionen gewàhlt werden, wie beispielsweise zwischen Sach- und Geldleistungen, Universalitàt und Selektion, Absicherung und Zuweisung von Leistungen. SchlieBlich muB der Staat uber seine Verantwortlichkeit bei der Sozialversicherung hinaus eine wichtige Rolle bei der Regulierung des gesamten Angebotes spielen. [eng] Managing the Dependency Risk: The Role of the Family, the Government . Even though public handling of dependency is non- negligible, coverage of this risk still relies for the most part on family solidarity. Current socio-demographic trends point to the limits of this voluntary aid and thus underscore the benefits of incorporating the dependency risk more into a mutual insurance system. . Private insurance can only partially meet this need. There is a concern that people might run up larger health bills just because they are insured (opportunistic behaviour) and the risk of a drift in the cost of coverage. This prompts insurers to offer only limited coverage, which is nevertheless still too expensive for a considerable proportion of the population and the Private Sector Financial constraints such as efficiency considerations rule out the idea of complete coverage by the public sector to totally replace the family and the private sector. Yet a rationalization, and even an extension, of existing coverage appears to be called for. A number of choices with varying implications need to be made concerning: benefits in kind as opposed to cash benefits, universality as opposed to selectivity, and what management methods and benefit allocation methods should be used. Lastly, in addition to its social security responsibilities, the government has an important role to play in regulating the entire supply.

Suggested Citation

  • Pascale Genier, 1996. "La gestion du risque dépendance : le rôle de la famille, de l'État et du secteur privé," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 291(1), pages 103-117.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecstat:estat_0336-1454_1996_num_291_1_6032
    DOI: 10.3406/estat.1996.6032
    Note: DOI:10.3406/estat.1996.6032
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Plisson, Manuel, 2009. "Assurabilité et développement de l'assurance dépendance," Economics Thesis from University Paris Dauphine, Paris Dauphine University, number 123456789/5064 edited by Lorenzi, Jean-Hervé.
    4. Agnès Gramain & Jérôme Wittwer, 2010. "Prise en charge des personnes âgées dépendantes : quels enjeux économiques ?," Post-Print halshs-00705568, HAL.

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