IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/prs/ecoprv/ecop_0249-4744_1999_num_138_2_5959.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Redistribution, inégalité et chômage

Author

Listed:
  • Vincent Touzé

Abstract

[fre] Redistribution, inégalité et chômage par Vincent Touzé . L'objet de cet article est de proposer un fondement théorique de la relation inégalité-chômage mise en évidence de façon empirique. Pour ce faire, on utilise une économie à générations imbriquées dans laquelle l'État redistribue les richesses entre les individus à l' aide d' une taxation linéaire. Les caractéristiques des individus ne sont pas observables et les paramètres du système de redistribution sont choisis au moyen du modèle de taxation optimale de Mirrlees. Un tel système de redistribution engendre une relation entre inégalité et chômage. Le problème de la redistribution optimale s'envisage comme un arbitrage particulier entre inégalité et chômage. A long terme, l'impact sur le pouvoir d'achat stationnaire peut aussi intervenir. Ces résultats sont illustrés à l'aide d'un exemple numérique. [eng] Redistribution, Inequality and Unemployment by Vincent Touzé . This paper proposes a theoretical foundation for the empirically observed inequahty-unemployment relation. This is achieved with an overlapping generations economy in which the government applies linear taxation to redistribute wealth amongst individuals. The individuals' characteristics are not observable and the parameters of the redistribution system are chosen using the Mirrlees optimal taxation model. This kind of redistribution system creates a relation between inequaUty and unemployment. The optimal redistribution system is seen as a specific choice between inequality and unemployment. Static purchasing power can also be affected in the long run. These findings are illustrated by a numerical example.

Suggested Citation

  • Vincent Touzé, 1999. "Redistribution, inégalité et chômage," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 138(2), pages 61-75.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_1999_num_138_2_5959
    DOI: 10.3406/ecop.1999.5959
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.1999.5959
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.3406/ecop.1999.5959
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.persee.fr/doc/ecop_0249-4744_1999_num_138_2_5959
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.3406/ecop.1999.5959?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lucas, Robert E, Jr, 1990. "Why Doesn't Capital Flow from Rich to Poor Countries?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(2), pages 92-96, May.
    2. Thomas Piketty, 1997. "La redistribution fiscale face au chômage," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 12(1), pages 157-201.
    3. Jullien, Bruno & Picard, Pierre, 1998. "A Classical Model of Involuntary Unemployment: Efficiency Wages and Macroeconomic Policy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(2), pages 263-285, February.
    4. J. A. Mirrlees, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 38(2), pages 175-208.
    5. Sen, Amartya, 1973. "On Economic Inequality," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198281931.
    6. Thomas Piketty, 1997. "Immigration et justice sociale," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 48(5), pages 1291-1309.
    7. Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-444, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Findeisen, Sebastian & Sachs, Dominik, 2014. "Efficient Labor and Capital Income Taxation over the Life Cycle," Working Papers 14-17, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
    2. Rosen, Sherwin, 1985. "Implicit Contracts: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 23(3), pages 1144-1175, September.
    3. Peter J. Lambert & Helen T. Naughton, 2009. "The Equal Absolute Sacrifice Principle Revisited," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(2), pages 328-349, April.
    4. Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol & Llavador, Humberto, 2018. "Inequality reducing properties of progressive income tax schedules: the case of endogenous income," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(1), January.
    5. Jacquet, Laurence & Lehmann, Etienne & Van der Linden, Bruno, 2013. "Optimal redistributive taxation with both extensive and intensive responses," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 1770-1805.
    6. Aronsson, Thomas & Micheletto, Luca, 2017. "Optimal Redistributive Income Taxation and Efficiency Wages," Umeå Economic Studies 953, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
    7. Michael Carlos Best & Henrik Jacobsen Jacobsen, 2013. "Optimal Income Taxation with Career Effects of Work Effort," Working Papers 2013-9, Princeton University. Economics Department..
    8. Boadway, Robin & Jacquet, Laurence, 2008. "Optimal marginal and average income taxation under maximin," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 425-441, November.
    9. Étienne Lehmann, 2016. "A la recherche des incitations perdues : pour une fusion de la prime d’activité, de la CSG, des cotisations sociales et de l’impôt sur le revenu," Revue française d'économie, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 0(1), pages 153-185.
    10. Athreya, Kartik B., 2014. "Big Ideas in Macroeconomics: A Nontechnical View," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262019736, April.
    11. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2017. "The Revolution of Information Economics: The Past and the Future," NBER Working Papers 23780, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Boadway, Robin & Cuff, Katherine & Marceau, Nicolas, 2003. "Redistribution and employment policies with endogenous unemployment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(11), pages 2407-2430, October.
    13. Kory Kroft & Kavan Kucko & Etienne Lehmann & Johannes Schmieder, 2020. "Optimal Income Taxation with Unemployment and Wage Responses: A Sufficient Statistics Approach," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 12(1), pages 254-292, February.
    14. Clément Carbonnier, 2023. "Welfare Economics and Neoliberalism: Interpreting the ideal type of perfect competition general equilibrium," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-04062786, HAL.
    15. Canegallo, Claudia, 1999. "Funzionamento del mercato del lavoro in presenza di informazione asimmetrica. Una rassegna della letteratura," POLIS Working Papers 8, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
    16. Lehmann, Etienne & Parmentier, Alexis & Van Der Linden, Bruno, 2011. "Optimal income taxation with endogenous participation and search unemployment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(11), pages 1523-1537.
    17. Dominik Sachs & Aleh Tsyvinski & Nicolas Werquin, 2020. "Nonlinear Tax Incidence and Optimal Taxation in General Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(2), pages 469-493, March.
    18. Boadway,Robin & Cuff,Katherine, 2022. "Tax Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781108949453, September.
    19. Laurent Simula & Alain Trannoy, 2012. "Shall we keep the highly skilled at home? The optimal income tax perspective," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 39(4), pages 751-782, October.
    20. Vincenzo Prete & Alessandro Sommacal & Claudio Zoli, 2016. "Optimal Non-Welfarist Income Taxation for Inequality and Polarization Reduction," Working Papers 23/2016, University of Verona, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E24 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity
    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_1999_num_138_2_5959. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Equipe PERSEE (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.persee.fr/collection/ecop .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.