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Nezávislost versus odpovědnost Evropské centrální banky - existuje řešení?
[Independence versus accountability of the European central bank - is there any solution?]

Author

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  • Martin Kvizda

Abstract

The article is concerned with analysis of independence of central banks of the EU Member States within the framework of the ESCB, as well as independence and responsibility of the ECB, and suggests an alternative institutional embodiment of its position, reflecting the specific framework of the EMU. The system of selection of members of the ECB's Executive Board blurs a real collective responsibility towards Member States, which opens possibilities for nontransparent lobbyism. Modified system is suggested so that national bank's governors have a symbolic relationship to the political representation, i.e. that they reflect a national economic policy in some way, without being bound and restricted by its formation whatsoever.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin Kvizda, 2005. "Nezávislost versus odpovědnost Evropské centrální banky - existuje řešení? [Independence versus accountability of the European central bank - is there any solution?]," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2005(5), pages 617-633.
    • Handle: RePEc:prg:jnlpol:v:2005:y:2005:i:5:id:526:p:617-633
    DOI: 10.18267/j.polek.526
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. J. De Haan & F. Amtenbrink & S.C.W. Eijffinger, 1999. "Accountability of central banks: aspects and quantification," BNL Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 52(209), pages 169-193.
    2. Eijffinger, Sylvester & Haan, Jakob de, 2000. "European Monetary and Fiscal Policy," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198776161.
    3. Charles Wyplosz, 1997. "EMU: Why and How It Might Happen," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 3-21, Fall.
    4. Eijffinger, S. & De Hann, J., 1995. "The Political Economy of Central Bank Independence," Papers 9587, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
    5. Charles Goodhart, 1988. "The Evolution of Central Banks," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262570734, April.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    European Central Bank; Economic and Monetary Union; co-ordination of economic policy; central bank?s accountability; central bank?s independency;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
    • F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission

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