IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/prg/jnlefa/v2017y2017i4id197p05-18.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

How Effective is the Registration of Sales?

Author

Listed:
  • Hana Zídková
  • Jana Tepperová

Abstract

The registration of sales is a topical issue of the tax policy and one of the recent measures against the shadow economy and tax evasion introduced in the Czech Republic. After its implementation, first evaluations of the impact on tax revenues are being provided. Within this paper, we discuss the methodology used to provide estimates of the increase in tax revenues based on the national accounts data, estimate the increase in VAT revenues for restaurant services and compare it with previous estimates. We provide three different estimates according to the assumed proportion of VAT non-tax payers based on national accounts data. According to our results, VAT revenues would increase by approx. 2.5 bill. CZK when all restaurants become VAT payers or by approximately 1 bill. CZK if only 8 % of restaurants remain VAT non-payers. If the proportion of VAT non-payers does not change after the registration of sales, the VAT revenues would decrease by 0.45 bill. CZK due to the reduction of the tax rate.

Suggested Citation

  • Hana Zídková & Jana Tepperová, 2017. "How Effective is the Registration of Sales?," European Financial and Accounting Journal, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2017(4), pages 5-18.
    • Handle: RePEc:prg:jnlefa:v:2017:y:2017:i:4:id:197:p:05-18
    DOI: 10.18267/j.efaj.197
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://efaj.vse.cz/doi/10.18267/j.efaj.197.html
    Download Restriction: free of charge
    File URL: http://efaj.vse.cz/doi/10.18267/j.efaj.197.pdf
    Download Restriction: free of charge
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.18267/j.efaj.197?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Frey, Bruno S., 2003. "Deterrence and tax morale in the European Union," European Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 11(3), pages 385-406, July.
    2. Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November.
    3. Richard M. Bird & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Benno Torgler, 2014. "Societal Institutions and Tax Effort in Developing Countries," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 15(1), pages 301-351, May.
    4. Hug, Simon & Spörri, Franziska, 2011. "Referendums, trust, and tax evasion," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 120-131, March.
    5. Schneider, Friedrich G. & Buehn, Andreas, 2009. "Shadow economies and corruption all over the world: revised estimates for 120 countries," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (2007-2020), Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), vol. 1, pages 1-53.
    6. Christian Daude & Hamlet Gutierrez & Ángel Melguizo, 2013. "What Drives Tax Morale? A Focus on Emerging Economies," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 207(4), pages 9-40, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ioana Alexandra Horodnic & Colin C. Williams, 2016. "An evaluation of the shadow economy in Baltic states: a tax morale perspective," International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Small Business, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 28(2/3), pages 339-358.
    2. Torgler, Benno & Schneider, Friedrich, 2007. "Shadow Economy, Tax Morale, Governance and Institutional Quality: A Panel Analysis," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt26s710z8, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    3. Colin C. Williams & Ioana A. Horodnic, 2015. "Explaining and tackling the shadow economy in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania: a tax morale approach," Baltic Journal of Economics, Baltic International Centre for Economic Policy Studies, vol. 15(2), pages 81-98.
    4. Djanali, Iwan & Sheehan-Connor, Damien, 2012. "Tax affinity hypothesis: Do we really hate paying taxes?," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 33(4), pages 758-775.
    5. Torgler, Benno & Schneider, Friedrich, 2007. "Shadow Economy, Tax Morale, Governance and Institutional Quality: A Panel Analysis," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt26s710z8, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    6. Torgler, Benno & Schneider, Friedrich & Schaltegger, Christoph A., 2007. "With or Against the People? The Impact of a Bottom-Up Approach on Tax Morale and the Shadow Economy," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt6331x6vz, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    7. Puklavec, Žiga & Kogler, Christoph & Stavrova, Olga & Zeelenberg, Marcel, 2023. "What we tweet about when we tweet about taxes: A topic modelling approach," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 212(C), pages 1242-1254.
    8. Jahnke, Bjoern, 2015. "Tax morale and reciprocity. A case study from Vietnam," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-563, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
    9. C. Williams, Colin & Kayaoglu, Aysegul, 2016. "Tackling The Informal Economy In The European Union: A Social Actor Approach," UTMS Journal of Economics, University of Tourism and Management, Skopje, Macedonia, vol. 7(2), pages 133-147.
    10. Laszlo Goerke, 2015. "Income tax buyouts and income tax evasion," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 22(1), pages 120-143, February.
    11. Ahmad Farhan Alshira’h & Moh’d Alsqour & Abdalwali Lutfi & Adi Alsyouf & Malek Alshirah, 2020. "A Socio-Economic Model of Sales Tax Compliance," Economies, MDPI, vol. 8(4), pages 1-15, October.
    12. Torgler, Benno & Schneider, Friedrich, 2009. "The impact of tax morale and institutional quality on the shadow economy," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 228-245, April.
    13. Schneider Friedrich & Buehn Andreas, 2017. "Shadow Economy: Estimation Methods, Problems, Results and Open questions," Open Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-29, March.
    14. Bazart, C. & Bonein, A., 2014. "Reciprocal relationships in tax compliance decisions," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 83-102.
    15. Levaggi, Rosella & Menoncin, Francesco, 2016. "Optimal dynamic tax evasion: A portfolio approach," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 115-129.
    16. Marisa Ratto & Richard Thomas & David Ulph, 2013. "The Indirect Effects of Auditing Taxpayers," Public Finance Review, , vol. 41(3), pages 317-333, May.
    17. Bejaković Predrag & Bezeredi Slavko, 2019. "Determinants of Tax Morale in Croatia: an Ordered Logit Model," Business Systems Research, Sciendo, vol. 10(2), pages 37-48, September.
    18. Batrancea, Larissa & Nichita, Anca & Olsen, Jerome & Kogler, Christoph & Kirchler, Erich & Hoelzl, Erik & Weiss, Avi & Torgler, Benno & Fooken, Jonas & Fuller, Joanne & Schaffner, Markus & Banuri, She, 2019. "Trust and power as determinants of tax compliance across 44 nations," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    19. Gabriel Leonardo & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, 2016. "Politicians, bureaucrats, and tax morale: What shapes tax compliance attitudes?," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper1608, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    20. Andrew Feltenstein & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Biplab Datta & Sohani Fatehin, 2022. "A general equilibrium model of Value Added Tax evasion: an application to Pakistan," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 537-556, July.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Registration of sales; Shadow economy; Concealed revenues; Estimates;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:prg:jnlefa:v:2017:y:2017:i:4:id:197:p:05-18. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Stanislav Vojir (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/uevsecz.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.