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Valid commercial reasons for mergers
[Řádné ekonomické důvody realizace fúzí z pohledu daňového práva a ekonomie]

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  • Jáchym Lukeš

Abstract

National and European tax legislation deals with the notion of proper economic reasons for mergers. The aim of this article is to link the economic and tax perspective on the implementation of mergers of companies and in this framework to characterize the basic rules for assessing mergers of companies in terms of tax law in practice. The economic and tax perspective is connected on a model example, on which the main methodological procedures for the assessment of mergers are presented. The connection between the two areas has led to clear conclusions for tax practice. It follows from the application of the so-called principle of abuse of law that it is necessary to assess the proper economic reasons for a merger only if it is clear that there is a tax motive for the implementation of a specific merger. This view could not have been previously applied due to a specific, inappropriate regulation in national legislation.From the conclusions of the basic economic models of oligopolies, it can be concluded that for mergers of related companies can not lead to economically relevant cost savings. The argument of cost savings as a proper economic reason for the merger of related companies is thus not possible in tax practice.The article further outlines that for mergers of related companies there may be a so-called institutional or conditional reason for the merger, which could be considered as the only proper economic reason for the merger of related companies. Verification of the application of a similar principle can be recommended for further research.

Suggested Citation

  • Jáchym Lukeš, 2020. "Valid commercial reasons for mergers [Řádné ekonomické důvody realizace fúzí z pohledu daňového práva a ekonomie]," Český finanční a účetní časopis, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2020(2), pages 27-42.
  • Handle: RePEc:prg:jnlcfu:v:2020:y:2020:i:2:id:545:p:27-42
    DOI: 10.18267/j.cfuc.545
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Stephen W. Salant & Sheldon Switzer & Robert J. Reynolds, 1983. "Losses From Horizontal Merger: The Effects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(2), pages 185-199.
    2. Coase, R. H., 1990. "The Firm, the Market, and the Law," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226111018, January.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Oligopoly; Merger; Abuse of tax law; Oligopol; Fúze; Zneužití daňového práva;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • K34 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Tax Law

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