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Stable Heterogeneity for the Production of Diffusible Factors in Cell Populations

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  • Marco Archetti

Abstract

The production of diffusible molecules that promote survival and growth is common in bacterial and eukaryotic cell populations, and can be considered a form of cooperation between cells. While evolutionary game theory shows that producers and non-producers can coexist in well-mixed populations, there is no consensus on the possibility of a stable polymorphism in spatially structured populations where the effect of the diffusible molecule extends beyond one-step neighbours. I study the dynamics of biological public goods using an evolutionary game on a lattice, taking into account two assumptions that have not been considered simultaneously in existing models: that the benefit of the diffusible molecule is a non-linear function of its concentration, and that the molecule diffuses according to a decreasing gradient. Stable coexistence of producers and non-producers is observed when the benefit of the molecule is a sigmoid function of its concentration, while strictly diminishing returns lead to coexistence only for very specific parameters and linear benefits never lead to coexistence. The shape of the diffusion gradient is largely irrelevant and can be approximated by a step function. Since the effect of a biological molecule is generally a sigmoid function of its concentration (as described by the Hill equation), linear benefits or strictly diminishing returns are not an appropriate approximations for the study of biological public goods. A stable polymorphism of producers and non-producers is in line with the predictions of evolutionary game theory and likely to be common in cell populations.

Suggested Citation

  • Marco Archetti, 2014. "Stable Heterogeneity for the Production of Diffusible Factors in Cell Populations," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 9(9), pages 1-8, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:plo:pone00:0108526
    DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0108526
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. David Bruce Borenstein & Yigal Meir & Joshua W Shaevitz & Ned S Wingreen, 2013. "Non-Local Interaction via Diffusible Resource Prevents Coexistence of Cooperators and Cheaters in a Lattice Model," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 8(5), pages 1-10, May.
    2. Paul B. Rainey & Katrina Rainey, 2003. "Evolution of cooperation and conflict in experimental bacterial populations," Nature, Nature, vol. 425(6953), pages 72-74, September.
    3. Henry H. Lee & Michael N. Molla & Charles R. Cantor & James J. Collins, 2010. "Bacterial charity work leads to population-wide resistance," Nature, Nature, vol. 467(7311), pages 82-85, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Marco Archetti, 2018. "How to Analyze Models of Nonlinear Public Goods," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(2), pages 1-15, April.
    2. Javad Salimi Sartakhti & Mohammad Hossein Manshaei & Marco Archetti, 2018. "Game Theory of Tumor–Stroma Interactions in Multiple Myeloma: Effect of Nonlinear Benefits," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(2), pages 1-11, May.
    3. Javad Salimi Sartakhti & Mohammad Hossein Manshaei & David Basanta & Mehdi Sadeghi, 2017. "Evolutionary emergence of angiogenesis in avascular tumors using a spatial public goods game," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 12(4), pages 1-17, April.

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