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Quantum Attack-Resistent Certificateless Multi-Receiver Signcryption Scheme

Author

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  • Huixian Li
  • Xubao Chen
  • Liaojun Pang
  • Weisong Shi

Abstract

The existing certificateless signcryption schemes were designed mainly based on the traditional public key cryptography, in which the security relies on the hard problems, such as factor decomposition and discrete logarithm. However, these problems will be easily solved by the quantum computing. So the existing certificateless signcryption schemes are vulnerable to the quantum attack. Multivariate public key cryptography (MPKC), which can resist the quantum attack, is one of the alternative solutions to guarantee the security of communications in the post-quantum age. Motivated by these concerns, we proposed a new construction of the certificateless multi-receiver signcryption scheme (CLMSC) based on MPKC. The new scheme inherits the security of MPKC, which can withstand the quantum attack. Multivariate quadratic polynomial operations, which have lower computation complexity than bilinear pairing operations, are employed in signcrypting a message for a certain number of receivers in our scheme. Security analysis shows that our scheme is a secure MPKC-based scheme. We proved its security under the hardness of the Multivariate Quadratic (MQ) problem and its unforgeability under the Isomorphism of Polynomials (IP) assumption in the random oracle model. The analysis results show that our scheme also has the security properties of non-repudiation, perfect forward secrecy, perfect backward secrecy and public verifiability. Compared with the existing schemes in terms of computation complexity and ciphertext length, our scheme is more efficient, which makes it suitable for terminals with low computation capacity like smart cards.

Suggested Citation

  • Huixian Li & Xubao Chen & Liaojun Pang & Weisong Shi, 2013. "Quantum Attack-Resistent Certificateless Multi-Receiver Signcryption Scheme," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 8(6), pages 1-8, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:plo:pone00:0049141
    DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0049141
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    Cited by:

    1. Ahmed Abdulqader Hussein & Chee Yen Leow & Tharek A Rahman, 2017. "Robust multiple frequency multiple power localization schemes in the presence of multiple jamming attacks," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 12(5), pages 1-43, May.

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