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Empathy Moderates the Effect of Repetitive Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation of the Right Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex on Costly Punishment

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  • Martin Brüne
  • Dirk Scheele
  • Christine Heinisch
  • Cumhur Tas
  • Julia Wischniewski
  • Onur Güntürkün

Abstract

Humans incur considerable costs to punish unfairness directed towards themselves or others. Recent studies using repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) suggest that the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) is causally involved in such strategic decisions. Presently, two partly divergent hypotheses are discussed, suggesting either that the right DLPFC is necessary to control selfish motives by implementing culturally transmitted social norms, or is involved in suppressing emotion-driven prepotent responses to perceived unfairness. Accordingly, we studied the role of the DLPFC in costly (i.e. third party) punishment by applying rTMS to the left and right DLPFC before playing a Dictator Game with the option to punish observed unfair behavior (DG-P). In addition, sham stimulation took place. Individual differences in empathy were assessed with the German version of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index. Costly punishment increased (non-significantly) upon disruption of the right – but not the left – DLPFC as compared to sham stimulation. However, empathy emerged as a highly significant moderator variable of the effect of rTMS over the right, but not left, DLPFC, suggesting that the right DLPFC is involved in controlling prepotent emotional responses to observed unfairness, depending on individual differences in empathy.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin Brüne & Dirk Scheele & Christine Heinisch & Cumhur Tas & Julia Wischniewski & Onur Güntürkün, 2012. "Empathy Moderates the Effect of Repetitive Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation of the Right Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex on Costly Punishment," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 7(9), pages 1-8, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:plo:pone00:0044747
    DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0044747
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    1. Herbert Gintis, 2000. "Strong Reciprocity and Human Sociality," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2000-02, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
    2. Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, 2003. "The nature of human altruism," Nature, Nature, vol. 425(6960), pages 785-791, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jillian Jordan & Katherine McAuliffe & David Rand, 2016. "The effects of endowment size and strategy method on third party punishment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 19(4), pages 741-763, December.
    2. Martin Brüne & Georg Juckel & Björn Enzi, 2013. "“An Eye for an Eye”? Neural Correlates of Retribution and Forgiveness," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 8(8), pages 1-1, August.
    3. Shi, Zhenyu & Wei, Wei & Zheng, Hongwei & Zheng, Zhiming, 2023. "Bidirectional supervision: An effective method to suppress corruption and defection under the third party punishment mechanism of donation games," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 450(C).

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