Author
Listed:
- Sergey Gavrilets
- Edgar A Duenez-Guzman
- Michael D Vose
Abstract
Background: Arguably the most influential force in human history is the formation of social coalitions and alliances (i.e., long-lasting coalitions) and their impact on individual power. Understanding the dynamics of alliance formation and its consequences for biological, social, and cultural evolution is a formidable theoretical challenge. In most great ape species, coalitions occur at individual and group levels and among both kin and non-kin. Nonetheless, ape societies remain essentially hierarchical, and coalitions rarely weaken social inequality. In contrast, human hunter-gatherers show a remarkable tendency to egalitarianism, and human coalitions and alliances occur not only among individuals and groups, but also among groups of groups. These observations suggest that the evolutionary dynamics of human coalitions can only be understood in the context of social networks and cognitive evolution. Methodology/Principal Findings: Here, we develop a stochastic model describing the emergence of networks of allies resulting from within-group competition for status or mates between individuals utilizing dyadic information. The model shows that alliances often emerge in a phase transition-like fashion if the group size, awareness, aggressiveness, and persuasiveness of individuals are large and the decay rate of individual affinities is small. With cultural inheritance of social networks, a single leveling alliance including all group members can emerge in several generations. Conclusions/Significance: We propose a simple and flexible theoretical approach for studying the dynamics of alliance emergence applicable where game-theoretic methods are not practical. Our approach is both scalable and expandable. It is scalable in that it can be generalized to larger groups, or groups of groups. It is expandable in that it allows for inclusion of additional factors such as behavioral, genetic, social, and cultural features. Our results suggest that a rapid transition from a hierarchical society of great apes to an egalitarian society of hunter-gatherers (often referred to as “egalitarian revolution”) could indeed follow an increase in human cognitive abilities. The establishment of stable group-wide egalitarian alliances creates conditions promoting the origin of cultural norms favoring the group interests over those of individuals.
Suggested Citation
Sergey Gavrilets & Edgar A Duenez-Guzman & Michael D Vose, 2008.
"Dynamics of Alliance Formation and the Egalitarian Revolution,"
PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 3(10), pages 1-9, October.
Handle:
RePEc:plo:pone00:0003293
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0003293
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Cited by:
- Li, Yixiao & Jin, Xiaogang & Su, Xianchuang & Kong, Fansheng & Peng, Chengbin, 2010.
"Cooperation and charity in spatial public goods game under different strategy update rules,"
Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 389(5), pages 1090-1098.
- Boris Salazar-Trujillo & María Isabel Caicedo-Hurtado & Gildardo Vanegas-Muñoz, 2021.
"Afinidades violentas: la evolución de la red de narcotraficantes del norte del Valle,"
Revista Sociedad y Economía, Universidad del Valle, CIDSE, issue 42, January.
- Pilwon Kim, 2014.
"A Simple Model of Ostracism Formation,"
PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 9(4), pages 1-6, April.
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