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Do the Rich Vote Conservative Because They Are Rich?

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  • Jo Thori Lind

Abstract

Political economics predicts that the rich oppose redistribution and vote for conservative parties. Although this seemingly fits the data well in most countries, I show that the relationship breaks down when we control for unobservable characteristics. Using Norwegian survey data, I study to what extent voting is caused by income. Although a positive association between income and conservative voting persists when controlling for unobservables, the magnitude of the effect is reduced by a factor of five. To correct for measurement error, I instrument income with average income by profession. The magnitude of the coefficients becomes higher, but the main conclusion remains.

Suggested Citation

  • Jo Thori Lind, 2010. "Do the Rich Vote Conservative Because They Are Rich?," Review of Economics and Institutions, Università di Perugia, vol. 1(2).
    • Handle: RePEc:pia:review:v:1:y:2010:i:2:n:5
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    2. Lind Jo Thori, 2007. "Does Permanent Income Determine the Vote?," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-27, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lind Jo Thori, 2007. "Does Permanent Income Determine the Vote?," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-27, July.
    2. G. Andersen, Asbjørn & Franklin, Simon & Getahun, Tigabu & Kotsadam, Andreas & Somville, Vincent & Villanger, Espen, 2023. "Does wealth reduce support for redistribution? Evidence from an Ethiopian housing lottery," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 224(C).
    3. Bernt Bratsberg & Andreas Kotsadam & Jo Thori Lind & Halvor Mehlum & Oddbjørn Raaum, 2019. "Election Turnout Inequality - Insights from Administrative Registers," CESifo Working Paper Series 7465, CESifo.
    4. Jo Thori Lind, 2005. "Why is there so little redistribution?," Nordic Journal of Political Economy, Nordic Journal of Political Economy, vol. 31, pages 111-125.
    5. Markussen, Simen, 2008. "How the left prospers from prosperity," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 329-342, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    political economy; redistribution; voting; multinomial logit; panel data;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
    • C25 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions; Probabilities
    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs

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