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Excise Taxation and the Theory of Tax Exploitation

Author

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  • Hunter, William J
  • Nelson, Michael A

Abstract

Individual preference for public goods and tax regimes are modeled in a utility-maximizing framework and the implications of the model are explored within the context of a median voter process. It is demonstrated that excise taxes, judiciously selected, may offer a political majority an excellent vehicle to shift a disproportionate share of the cost of government onto a minority. A central hypothesis that evolves from the model is that support for an excise tax rises as the percent of the population consuming that base falls. Empirical evidence is observed for state excise taxes levied on beer and cigarettes.

Suggested Citation

  • Hunter, William J & Nelson, Michael A, 1990. "Excise Taxation and the Theory of Tax Exploitation," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 45(2), pages 268-282.
  • Handle: RePEc:pfi:pubfin:v:45:y:1990:i:2:p:268-82
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    Cited by:

    1. Susanne Lohmann & Deborah M. Weiss, 2002. "Hidden Taxes and Representative Government: The Political Economy of the Ramsey Rule," Public Finance Review, , vol. 30(6), pages 579-611, November.
    2. Leonzio Rizzo & Alejandro Esteller - Moré, 2011. "US Excise Tax Horizontal Interdependence: Yardstick vs. Tax Competition," Working Papers 201116, University of Ferrara, Department of Economics.
    3. Alejandro Esteller-Moré & Leonzio Rizzo, 2014. "US excise tax horizontal interdependence: yardstick versus tax competition," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 52(3), pages 711-737, May.

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