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Tax Evasion and the Differential Taxation of Labor and Capital Income

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  • McCaleb, Thomas S

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Suggested Citation

  • McCaleb, Thomas S, 1976. "Tax Evasion and the Differential Taxation of Labor and Capital Income," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 31(2), pages 287-294.
  • Handle: RePEc:pfi:pubfin:v:31:y:1976:i:2:p:287-94
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    Cited by:

    1. Otusanya, Olatunde Julius, 2011. "The role of multinational companies in tax evasion and tax avoidance: The case of Nigeria," CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ACCOUNTING, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 316-332.
    2. Roger N. Waud, 1985. "Tax Aversion, Deficits and the Tax Rate-Tax Revenue Relationship," NBER Working Papers 1533, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Waud, Roger N, 1988. "Tax Aversion, Optimal Tax Rates, and Indexation," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 43(2), pages 310-325.
    4. Josef Falkinger & Herbert Walther, 1991. "Rewards Versus Penalties: on a New Policy against Tax Evasion," Public Finance Review, , vol. 19(1), pages 67-79, January.
    5. Sokolovskyi, Dmytro & Sokolovska, Olena, 2016. "Tax burden optimization on economic agents by modeling interaction in the taxation system," MPRA Paper 71110, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 05 May 2016.
    6. Sokolovskyi, Dmytro, 2018. "Game-theoretic model of tax evasion: analysis of agents’ interaction and optimization of tax burden," MPRA Paper 86415, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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