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Income Distribution And Rent Seeking Costs: A Note

Author

Listed:
  • Maria Alessandra Antonelli

    (“La Sapienza” University of Rome, Faculty of Law, Italy)

Abstract

This paper analyzes a rent seeking competition where risk neutral agents have a different income. The individual income is private information but the income distribution is common information. Like the Hillman and Samet (1987) model the individual outlays in rent seeking is equal to the expected rent, but the winning probability for each agent is a function of its income. As a consequence, the social costs of the rent seeking depend on the income distribution and they can be lesser than the traditional measure pointed out by Hillman and Samet (1987).

Suggested Citation

  • Maria Alessandra Antonelli, 2010. "Income Distribution And Rent Seeking Costs: A Note," Annals of the University of Petrosani, Economics, University of Petrosani, Romania, vol. 10(3), pages 5-12.
    • Handle: RePEc:pet:annals:v:10:y:2010:i:3:p:5-12
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Francesco Parisi, 2005. "Rents, dissipation and lost treasures: Rethinking Tullock's paradox," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(3), pages 411-422, September.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    rent-seeking; dissipation of rent; income distribution;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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