IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/pal/jorsoc/v67y2016i5p770-785.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Equilibrium contract selection strategy in chain-to-chain competition with demand uncertainty

Author

Listed:
  • Yaner Fang

    (Post-doctoral Workstation, Bank of Communications, Shanghai, China
    Institute of Finance and Banking, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, China)

  • Yao-Yu Wang

    (Dongwu Business School, Soochow University, Suzhou, China)

  • Zhongsheng Hua

    (School of Management, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China)

Abstract

This paper investigates the equilibrium contract selection problem for the dominant suppliers in two competing supply chains with stochastic and price-sensitive demand. The two suppliers, acting as the Stackelberg leaders, produce substitutable products and distribute them through each exclusive retailer, and can provide either a consignment contract or a wholesale-price contract. The equilibrium behaviours of the suppliers and retailers are investigated in three different scenarios: (1) the consignment contract scenario; (2) the wholesale-price contract scenario; and (3) the hybrid contract scenario. We prove that the equilibrium contracting strategy is of the threshold type: when the cost-share rates of the two retailers are above certain thresholds, both suppliers select consignment contracts; when the cost-share rates of the two retailers are lower than certain thresholds, both suppliers select wholesale-price contracts; when one retailer’s cost-share rate is above a certain threshold and the other is lower than a certain threshold, the supplier with large retailer’s cost-share rate selects the consignment contract and the other supplier with small retailer’s cost-share rate selects the wholesale-price contract. Furthermore, these thresholds depend on price sensitivities.

Suggested Citation

  • Yaner Fang & Yao-Yu Wang & Zhongsheng Hua, 2016. "Equilibrium contract selection strategy in chain-to-chain competition with demand uncertainty," Journal of the Operational Research Society, Palgrave Macmillan;The OR Society, vol. 67(5), pages 770-785, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:pal:jorsoc:v:67:y:2016:i:5:p:770-785
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jors/journal/v67/n5/pdf/jors201583a.pdf
    File Function: Link to full text PDF
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jors/journal/v67/n5/full/jors201583a.html
    File Function: Link to full text HTML
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Zheng, Xiao-Xue & Li, Deng-Feng, 2023. "A new biform game-based investment incentive mechanism for eco-efficient innovation in supply chain," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 258(C).
    2. Feng Tao & Yanhong Xie & Yao-Yu Wang & Fujun Lai & Kin Keung Lai, 2022. "Contract strategies in competitive supply chains subject to inventory inaccuracy," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 309(2), pages 641-661, February.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pal:jorsoc:v:67:y:2016:i:5:p:770-785. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.palgrave-journals.com/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.