IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/pal/jorsoc/v64y2013i8p1269-1278.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Optimal gainshare/painshare in alliance projects

Author

Listed:
  • S M Hosseinian

    (The University of New South Wales, NSW, Australia)

  • D G Carmichael

    (The University of New South Wales, NSW, Australia)

Abstract

Alliances are popularly used in delivering infrastructure. However, discussion is ongoing as to what is the optimal gainshare/painshare arrangement. This paper derives a result for the optimal gainshare/painshare between risk-averse parties, where the level of aversion may range from very large to being risk neutral. The derivation is based on solving an optimization problem using concepts from agency theory. The influence of the parties’ level of risk aversion and outcome uncertainty is examined. Practitioners were engaged in a designed exercise in order to validate the approach and propositions. The paper shows that: (i) the optimal gainshare/painshare arrangement in alliances is linear in the project outcome; (ii) the optimal gain/pain share to the contractor should decrease with increasing contractor level of risk aversion and/or decreasing owner level of risk aversion; and (iii) the outcome uncertainty has no influence on the optimal gainshare/painshare. The paper provides those who write alliance contracts with recommendations on gainshare/painshare. This study casts new light on establishing optimal alliance arrangements in the construction industry.

Suggested Citation

  • S M Hosseinian & D G Carmichael, 2013. "Optimal gainshare/painshare in alliance projects," Journal of the Operational Research Society, Palgrave Macmillan;The OR Society, vol. 64(8), pages 1269-1278, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:pal:jorsoc:v:64:y:2013:i:8:p:1269-1278
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jors/journal/v64/n8/pdf/jors2012146a.pdf
    File Function: Link to full text PDF
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jors/journal/v64/n8/full/jors2012146a.html
    File Function: Link to full text HTML
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Guangdong Wu, 2017. "A Multi-Objective Trade-Off Model in Sustainable Construction Projects," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 9(11), pages 1-18, October.
    2. Haikun Han & Juqin Shen & Bo Liu & Han Han, 2022. "Dynamic Incentive Mechanism for Large-scale Projects Based on the Reputation Effects," SAGE Open, , vol. 12(4), pages 21582440221, October.
    3. Yongcheng Fu & Yongqiang Chen & Shuibo Zhang & Wenqian Wang, 2015. "Promoting cooperation in construction projects: an integrated approach of contractual incentive and trust," Construction Management and Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 33(8), pages 653-670, August.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pal:jorsoc:v:64:y:2013:i:8:p:1269-1278. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.palgrave-journals.com/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.