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A smuggling game with asymmetrical information of players

Author

Listed:
  • R Hohzaki

    (National Defense Academy, Kanagawa, Japan)

  • R Masuda

    (National Defense Academy, Kanagawa, Japan)

Abstract

This paper deals with a smuggling game with multiple stages. Customs is allowed to patrol within the limited number of chances and obtain reward by the capture of a smuggler. The smuggler gets a reward depending on the amount of contraband he succeeds to ship in smuggling at each stage. The pay-off of the game is zero-sum. In almost all past studies, they adopt the alternative of smuggling or non-smuggling as the smuggler's strategy. From the point of view of information, some researchers assumed that both players could observe their opponent's behaviour at the past stage or a few assumed that both players had no information about their opponent. Other than these types of smuggling games with the symmetric information, we introduce the asymmetrical acquisition of information or the concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the smuggling game for the first time.

Suggested Citation

  • R Hohzaki & R Masuda, 2012. "A smuggling game with asymmetrical information of players," Journal of the Operational Research Society, Palgrave Macmillan;The OR Society, vol. 63(10), pages 1434-1446, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:pal:jorsoc:v:63:y:2012:i:10:p:1434-1446
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Fandel, G. & Trockel, J., 2013. "Avoiding non-optimal management decisions by applying a three-person inspection game," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 226(1), pages 85-93.
    2. Benjamin Florian Siggelkow & Jan Trockel & Oliver Dieterle, 2018. "An inspection game of internal audit and the influence of whistle-blowing," Journal of Business Economics, Springer, vol. 88(7), pages 883-914, September.
    3. Alpern, Steve & Fokkink, Robbert & Simanjuntak, Martin, 2016. "Optimal search and ambush for a hider who can escape the search region," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 251(3), pages 707-714.
    4. Puneet Agarwal & Kyle Hunt & Shivasubramanian Srinivasan & Jun Zhuang, 2020. "Fire Code Inspection and Compliance: A Game-Theoretic Model Between Fire Inspection Agencies and Building Owners," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 17(3), pages 208-226, September.

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