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Compensation across executive labor markets: What can we learn from cross-listed firms?

Author

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  • Colette Southam

    (Richard Ivey School of Business, The University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada)

  • Stephen Sapp

    (Richard Ivey School of Business, The University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada)

Abstract

There is wide consensus that chief executive officers (CEOs) of US firms earn significantly more than their Canadian counterparts. Using a matched sample, we find that the majority of this difference is due to US CEOs earning 50% more than CEOs of Canadian non-cross-listed firms. We find no such “US premium” for Canadian cross-listed firms, because the use of options allows the cross-listed firms to keep pace with their neighbors to the south. While firms that list only in Canada compete in the labor market defined by their national boundary, cross-listed firms appear to be competing directly with their US counterparts for executive talent. In investigating alternative explanations for the elimination of the compensation differential for Canadian cross-listed firms, we find evidence consistent with both the bonding and the rent extraction hypotheses.

Suggested Citation

  • Colette Southam & Stephen Sapp, 2010. "Compensation across executive labor markets: What can we learn from cross-listed firms?," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 41(1), pages 70-87, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:pal:jintbs:v:41:y:2010:i:1:p:70-87
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Schmid, Stefan & Altfeld, Frederic & Dauth, Tobias, 2018. "Americanization as a driver of CEO pay in Europe: The moderating role of CEO power," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 53(4), pages 433-451.
    2. Linsi, Lukas Andreas & Hopkin, Jonathan & Jaupart, Pascal, 2019. "Exporting the winner-take-all economy: micro-level evidence on the impact of US investors on executive pay in the United Kingdom," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 102217, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    3. Hang Le & Chris Brewster & Mehmet Demirbag & Geoffrey Wood, 2013. "Management Compensation Systems in MNCs and Domestic Firms," Management International Review, Springer, vol. 53(5), pages 741-762, October.
    4. Oh, Seungjoon & Ding, Keli & Park, Heungju, 2021. "Cross-listing, foreign independent directors and firm value," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 695-708.
    5. Peng, Mike W. & Su, Weichieh, 2014. "Cross-listing and the scope of the firm," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 42-50.
    6. Joseph J. Gerakos & Joseph D. Piotroski & Suraj Srinivasan, 2013. "Which U.S. Market Interactions Affect CEO Pay? Evidence from UK Companies," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 59(11), pages 2413-2434, November.
    7. Fernhaber, Stephanie A. & Li, Dan, 2013. "International exposure through network relationships: Implications for new venture internationalization," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 316-334.
    8. Khadija Straaten & Niccolò Pisani & Ans Kolk, 2020. "Unraveling the MNE wage premium," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 51(9), pages 1355-1390, December.
    9. Natasha Burns & Anna Kapalczynski & John K. Wald, 2021. "Independent director compensation, corruption, and monitoring," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 56(1), pages 5-28, February.

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