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A framework for managing regulatory policy life-cycle challenges: an empirical design

Author

Listed:
  • Abdulrahman Alrabiah

    (Griffith University Gold Coast)

  • Steve Drew

    (University of Tasmania)

Abstract

This paper proposes a process for developing a comprehensive policy life-cycle management (PLM) framework that institutionalises the essential elements of regulatory policy life-cycle implementation. Central banks face challenges during the life-cycle processes of regulatory policy management. The evident reasons for some of these challenges are missing significant policy quality attributes (PQAs) associated with the dynamics of multidimensional constraints that negatively impact the policies' return. This paper suggests using PQAs to formalise a systematic and comprehensive PLM framework. Thematic analysis of data collected at Saudi Central Bank (SAMA) revealed thirteen policy life-cycle challenges and identified eleven PQAs. The constructed PLM framework encompasses six phases: engineering, analysis, evaluation, execution, monitoring, and optimisation. The application of the PLM framework and its PQAs in a single case study provides insights into its potential usability and strength in improving regulatory policy implementation more broadly. The extended PLM framework's contribution is to open avenues of research and inform practice for diverse stakeholders such as regulatory authorities, policy science community engagement, and on-the ground regulatory policy initiatives.

Suggested Citation

  • Abdulrahman Alrabiah & Steve Drew, 2022. "A framework for managing regulatory policy life-cycle challenges: an empirical design," Journal of Banking Regulation, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 23(2), pages 210-223, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:pal:jbkreg:v:23:y:2022:i:2:d:10.1057_s41261-021-00158-0
    DOI: 10.1057/s41261-021-00158-0
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    References listed on IDEAS

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