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Self-Insurance and Self-Protection: A Nonexpected Utility Analysis

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  • Kai A. Konrad

    (Department of Economics, University of Munich, Schackstrasse 4, D-80539 Munich, Germany)

  • Stergios Skaperdas

    (Department of Economics, School of Social Sciences, University of California, CA 92717 Irvine)

Abstract

This paper studies the comparative statics of self-insurance and self-protection for individuals with rank-dependent expected utility preferences. In particular, proportional wealth risks, background risk, and limited liability are considered. Limited liability has a major impact on self-insurance and self-protection. It can reverse seemingly robust comparative static results for the case of self-insurance and can eliminate some puzzling ambiguities for the case of self-protection. The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory (1993) 18, 131–146. doi:10.1007/BF01111466

Suggested Citation

  • Kai A. Konrad & Stergios Skaperdas, 1993. "Self-Insurance and Self-Protection: A Nonexpected Utility Analysis," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 18(2), pages 131-146, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:pal:genrir:v:18:y:1993:i:2:p:131-146
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    Cited by:

    1. Richard Peter, 2021. "Who should exert more effort? Risk aversion, downside risk aversion and optimal prevention," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(4), pages 1259-1281, June.
    2. Wing Yan Lee & Derrick W. H. Fung, 2021. "Optimal Effort on Self-Insurance-Cum-Protection: A New Analysis Using Yaari’s Dual Theory," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 9(22), pages 1-12, November.
    3. Mario Brandtner, 2016. "Spektrale Risikomaße: Konzeption, betriebswirtschaftliche Anwendungen und Fallstricke," Management Review Quarterly, Springer, vol. 66(2), pages 75-115, April.
    4. Emmanuelle Augeraud-Véron & Marc Leandri, 2023. "Optimal self-protection and health risk perception: bridging the gap between risk theory and the Health Belief Model," EconomiX Working Papers 2023-12, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    5. Demers, Fanny S. & Demers, Michel, 1994. "Prudence, demand uncertainty background risk and the law of supply : anonexpected utility approach to the firm," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 9425, CEPREMAP.
    6. Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond E., 2015. "The tenuous relationship between effort and performance pay," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 32-39.
    7. François Maréchal, 2009. "Prevention of diseases and preventive co-payment rate," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 29(3), pages 2333-2342.
    8. Biener, Christian & Eling, Martin & Landmann, Andreas & Pradhan, Shailee, 2018. "Can group incentives alleviate moral hazard? The role of pro-social preferences," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 230-249.
    9. Henri Loubergé, 1998. "Risk and Insurance Economics 25 Years After," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 23(4), pages 540-567, October.
    10. Ghossoub, Mario, 2019. "Optimal insurance under rank-dependent expected utility," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 51-66.
    11. Sarah Bensalem, 2020. "Self-insurance and Non-concave Distortion Risk Measures," Working Papers hal-02936349, HAL.
    12. Sarah Bensalem & Nicolás Hernández Santibáñez & Nabil Kazi-Tani, 2019. "Prevention efforts, insurance demand and price incentives under coherent risk measures," Working Papers hal-01983433, HAL.
    13. Bensalem, Sarah & Santibáñez, Nicolás Hernández & Kazi-Tani, Nabil, 2020. "Prevention efforts, insurance demand and price incentives under coherent risk measures," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 369-386.
    14. Han Bleichrodt, 2022. "The prevention puzzle," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 47(2), pages 277-297, September.
    15. Sokolovskyi, Dmytro, 2018. "Game-theoretic model of tax evasion: analysis of agents’ interaction and optimization of tax burden," MPRA Paper 86415, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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