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Financial Crises and Central Bank Independence

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  • Alan S Blinder

Abstract

Although cooperation between central banks and treasuries is controversial, this paper contends that in a crisis it is inevitable and desirable. Six reasons for cooperation in a crisis are advanced. Disengagement in the aftermath and restoring central bank independence is tricky, however. The paper concludes with comments on what is necessary to maintain central bank credibility.

Suggested Citation

  • Alan S Blinder, 2013. "Financial Crises and Central Bank Independence," Business Economics, Palgrave Macmillan;National Association for Business Economics, vol. 48(3), pages 163-165, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:pal:buseco:v:48:y:2013:i:3:p:163-165
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    Cited by:

    1. Maxence Follot, 2024. "The impact of populism on central bank communication: Analyzing theoretical developments and the case of Hungary," European Journal of Comparative Economics, Cattaneo University (LIUC), vol. 21(1), pages 65-95, June.
    2. Andrieş, Alin Marius & Nistor, Simona & Sprincean, Nicu, 2020. "The impact of central bank transparency on systemic risk—Evidence from Central and Eastern Europe," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 51(C).
    3. Burkovskaya, Anastasia, 2019. "Political economy behind central bank independence," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 1-1.

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