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A principal-agent model of public research with a retrospective payoff rule

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  • Remo Fernández-Carro

Abstract

This article proposes a general principal-agent model for the public research system based on indirect retrospective payments — prefigured in Merton's reward system of science and other sociological explanations of science. According to the model, the institutional arrangements of non-for-profit research are set to solve the scientist's problem of assessing the principal's commitment to fulfilling the agreement, along with the principal's problem of controlling researcher's potential misbehaviour. Reciprocal trust is a consequence of the model and not a prior assumption. Institutions, procedures, and regulated activities in public science assure the appropriate behaviour of both parties. Copyright , Beech Tree Publishing.

Suggested Citation

  • Remo Fernández-Carro, 2007. "A principal-agent model of public research with a retrospective payoff rule," Science and Public Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 34(5), pages 317-328, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:scippl:v:34:y:2007:i:5:p:317-328
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.3152/030234207X227152
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