IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/scippl/v34y2007i10p691-698.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Focal randomisation: An optimal mechanism for the evaluation of R&D projects

Author

Listed:
  • Elise S Brezis

Abstract

In most countries, governments intervene in the process of R&D by financing a substantial part of it. The mechanism employed for choosing the projects to be financed is a committee composed of experts who evaluate projects in their field of specialisation, and decide which ones should be funded. This method is conservative. Proposals for new ideas are too often rejected, and inventions are commonly thrown out of the set of potential projects. In this paper, I propose a mechanism that will allow less conformity: focal randomisation. This states that projects that are unanimously ranked at the top by all reviewers will be adopted. Projects perceived as valueless by all are rejected, while projects that are ranked differently are randomised. I compare the average return under the present and proposed mechanisms. I examine under which conditions this new method is preferable, and its consequences on economic growth. Copyright , Beech Tree Publishing.

Suggested Citation

  • Elise S Brezis, 2007. "Focal randomisation: An optimal mechanism for the evaluation of R&D projects," Science and Public Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 34(10), pages 691-698, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:scippl:v:34:y:2007:i:10:p:691-698
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.3152/030234207X265394
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Charles Ayoubi & Michele Pezzoni & Fabiana Visentin, 2021. "Does It Pay to Do Novel Science? The Selectivity Patterns in Science Funding," Science and Public Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 48(5), pages 635-648.
    2. Elise S. Brezis & Aliaksandr Birukou, 2020. "Arbitrariness in the peer review process," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 123(1), pages 393-411, April.
    3. Nestor Duch-Brown & Jose Garcia-Quevedo & Daniel Montolio, 2008. "Assessing the assignation of public subsidies: Do the experts choose the most efficient R&D projects?," Working Papers in Economics 207, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
    4. Kevin Gross & Carl T Bergstrom, 2019. "Contest models highlight inherent inefficiencies of scientific funding competitions," PLOS Biology, Public Library of Science, vol. 17(1), pages 1-15, January.
    5. Elias Bouacida & Renaud Foucart, 2022. "Rituals of Reason," Working Papers 344119591, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
    6. Simon Hirzel & Tim Hettesheimer & Peter Viebahn & Manfred Fischedick, 2018. "A Decision Support System for Public Funding of Experimental Development in Energy Research," Energies, MDPI, vol. 11(6), pages 1-18, May.
    7. Hyun-Kyu KANG, 2015. "Development of Guideline for Preliminary Feasibility Study on Government R&D Programs in Korea," Proceedings of International Academic Conferences 2805212, International Institute of Social and Economic Sciences.
    8. Axel Philipps, 2022. "Research funding randomly allocated? A survey of scientists’ views on peer review and lottery," Science and Public Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 49(3), pages 365-377.
    9. Osterloh, Margit & Frey, Bruno S., 2020. "How to avoid borrowed plumes in academia," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 49(1).
    10. Weixi Xie & Pengfei Jia & Guangyao Zhang & Xianwen Wang, 2024. "Are reviewer scores consistent with citations?," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 129(8), pages 4721-4740, August.
    11. Elias Bouacida & Renaud Foucart, 2020. "The acceptability of lotteries in allocation problems," Working Papers 301646245, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:scippl:v:34:y:2007:i:10:p:691-698. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://academic.oup.com/spp .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.