IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/scippl/v31y2004i5p407-414.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A game theory analysis of how research organisations adapt their behaviour in the New Zealand competitively funded science system

Author

Listed:
  • Sean Devine
  • Colin Webb

Abstract

The New Zealand Government has reformed the way it invests in scientific research by establishing a Foundation to purchase research outputs competitively. However, competition alone does not seem able to deliver the national benefits expected of research, as some key behavioural characteristics have not emerged among research organisations. This paper, using a game theory approach, analyses why this might be and outlines how these key behaviours can be encouraged. Copyright , Beech Tree Publishing.

Suggested Citation

  • Sean Devine & Colin Webb, 2004. "A game theory analysis of how research organisations adapt their behaviour in the New Zealand competitively funded science system," Science and Public Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 31(5), pages 407-414, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:scippl:v:31:y:2004:i:5:p:407-414
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.3152/147154304781779877
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:scippl:v:31:y:2004:i:5:p:407-414. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://academic.oup.com/spp .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.