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Financial and Industrial Structure with Agency

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  • Williams, Joseph T

Abstract

A sub game perfect Nash equilibrium is characterized for an industry with dissipative costs of agency. In sequence, firms can enter the industry, raise capital with external debt and/or equity, invest in a capital-intensive technology or dissipate capital in perquisites, and finally produce output. For plausible values of two critical parameters, some, firms forego in equilibrium investments with positive net present values. Although more managers would like their firms to invest in the capital-intensive technology, they cannot raise the required cash in the capital market. In equilibrium, the industry can have both a profitable core of large, secure, capital intensive firms, with some debt but no unique optimal capital structure, and a competitive fringe of small, risky, labor-intensive firms. Even as the cost of entry converges to zero, capital-intensive firms can earn extraordinary profits, while all labor-intensive firms fail. With costly agency, access to capital can become a barrier to entry. Article published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Financial Studies in its journal, The Review of Financial Studies.

Suggested Citation

  • Williams, Joseph T, 1995. "Financial and Industrial Structure with Agency," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 8(2), pages 431-474.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:8:y:1995:i:2:p:431-74
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    Cited by:

    1. Anton Miglo, 2022. "Crowdfunding and bank financing: substitutes or complements?," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 59(3), pages 1115-1142, October.
    2. Anton Miglo, 2020. "Crowdfunding in a Competitive Environment," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 13(3), pages 1-38, February.
    3. Lily Qiu & Gerard Hoberg, 2005. "Future Industrial Organization and Stock Returns versus the Decision to Issue IPOs," Working Papers 2005-06, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    4. Jianjun Miao, 2005. "Optimal Capital Structure and Industry Dynamics," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(6), pages 2621-2659, December.
    5. Rosellon Cifuentes, M.A., 1999. "Essays on financial policy, liquidation values and product markets," Other publications TiSEM 802f644e-3e93-4815-bf33-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    6. Anton Miglo, 2021. "STO vs. ICO: A Theory of Token Issues under Moral Hazard and Demand Uncertainty," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 14(6), pages 1-35, May.
    7. Uddin, Md Hamid & Mollah, Sabur & Islam, Nazrul & Ali, Md Hakim, 2023. "Does digital transformation matter for operational risk exposure?," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
    8. Antonczyk, Ron Christian & Salzmann, Astrid Juliane, 2014. "Overconfidence and optimism: The effect of national culture on capital structure," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 132-151.
    9. Leach, J. Chris & Moyen, Nathalie & Yang, Jing, 2004. "On the Strategic Use of Debt and Capacity in Imperfectly Competitive Product Markets," SIFR Research Report Series 33, Institute for Financial Research.
    10. Michael Riordan, 2003. "How Do Capital Markets Influence Product Market Competition?," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 23(3), pages 179-191, December.
    11. Patricia M. Fairfield & Sundaresh Ramnath & Teri Lombardi Yohn, 2009. "Do Industry‐Level Analyses Improve Forecasts of Financial Performance?," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(1), pages 147-178, March.
    12. Mine Ertugrul & Erasmo Giambona, 2011. "Property Segment and REIT Capital Structure," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 43(4), pages 505-526, November.
    13. Chao Ma, 2019. "Does capital structure differently affect incumbents' responses to entry threat and actual entry?," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(4), pages 585-613, November.
    14. Haushalter, David & Klasa, Sandy & Maxwell, William F., 2007. "The influence of product market dynamics on a firm's cash holdings and hedging behavior," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(3), pages 797-825, June.
    15. Xiaodong Xu & John R. Birge, 2006. "Equity valuation, production, and financial planning: A stochastic programming approach," Naval Research Logistics (NRL), John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(7), pages 641-655, October.
    16. Murillo Campello & Erasmo Giambona, 2011. "Capital Structure and the Redeployability of Tangible Assets," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 11-091/2/DSF24, Tinbergen Institute.
    17. Le Pape, Nicolas, 2001. "Endettement des firmes et comportements de rivalité : l’apport des principaux modèles en économie industrielle," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 77(2), pages 281-302, juin.
    18. Lei, Jin & Qiu, Jiaping & Wan, Chi, 2018. "Asset tangibility, cash holdings, and financial development," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 223-242.
    19. Campello, Murillo, 2003. "Capital structure and product markets interactions: evidence from business cycles," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(3), pages 353-378, June.
    20. Hernán Ortiz-Molina & Gordon M. Phillips, 2010. "Asset Liquidity and the Cost of Capital," NBER Working Papers 15992, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    21. Jhang, Shih-Sian (Sherwin) & Ogden, Joseph P. & Suresh, Nallan C., 2019. "Operational and financial configurations contingent on market power status," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 91-109.

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