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The Partisanship of Financial Regulators

Author

Listed:
  • Joseph Engelberg
  • Matthew Henriksson
  • Asaf Manela
  • Jared Williams
  • Gregor Matvos

Abstract

We analyze the partisanship of Commissioners at the SEC and Governors at the Federal Reserve Board. Using recent advances in machine learning, we identify partisan phrases in Congress, such as “red tape” and “climate change,” and observe their usage among regulators. Although the Fed has remained relatively nonpartisan throughout our sample period (1930–2019), we find that partisanship among SEC Commissioners rose to an all-time high during the 2010-2019 period, driven by more-partisan Commissioners replacing less-partisan ones. Partisanship at the SEC appears in both the language of new SEC rules and the voting behavior of SEC Commissioners.Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Suggested Citation

  • Joseph Engelberg & Matthew Henriksson & Asaf Manela & Jared Williams & Gregor Matvos, 2023. "The Partisanship of Financial Regulators," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 36(11), pages 4373-4416.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:36:y:2023:i:11:p:4373-4416.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rfs/hhad029
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    G18; G28;

    JEL classification:

    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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