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Remote Board Meetings and Board Monitoring Effectiveness: Evidence from China

Author

Listed:
  • Xinni Cai
  • Fuxiu Jiang
  • Jun-Koo Kang
  • Wei Jiang

Abstract

Using Chinese data, we examine whether synchronous remote board meetings, which facilitate status equalization among directors and alleviate their pressure for conformity, affect board monitoring effectiveness. We find that compared to face-to-face meetings, synchronous remote meetings are associated with directors’ better meeting attendance behavior, a higher likelihood of director dissent on monitoring-related proposals, higher forced CEO turnover-performance sensitivity, and more effective investments. These results hold when we use remote meetings that include both synchronous and asynchronous remote meetings. Proposal-director level analysis further shows that remote meetings reduce the pressure to conform faced by young first-term directors and socially connected directors.Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Suggested Citation

  • Xinni Cai & Fuxiu Jiang & Jun-Koo Kang & Wei Jiang, 2023. "Remote Board Meetings and Board Monitoring Effectiveness: Evidence from China," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 36(11), pages 4318-4372.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:36:y:2023:i:11:p:4318-4372.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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