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Moral Hazard during the Housing Boom: Evidence from Private Mortgage Insurance

Author

Listed:
  • Neil Bhutta
  • Benjamin J Keys

Abstract

We provide novel evidence of misaligned incentives fueling a portion of the 2000s mortgage boom. We document that private mortgage insurance (PMI) companies expanded insurance issuance on high-risk mortgages purchased by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac at the tail end of the housing boom, without changing pricing and despite knowledge of heightened housing risk. The expansion of PMI facilitated an unprecedented increase in Fannie and Freddie’s risky purchases, extending the mortgage boom into 2007 and precipitating their collapse. We argue that this unraveling reflects a general moral hazard problem in insurance, coupled with misaligned incentives in the government-backed mortgage market.

Suggested Citation

  • Neil Bhutta & Benjamin J Keys, 2022. "Moral Hazard during the Housing Boom: Evidence from Private Mortgage Insurance," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 35(2), pages 771-813.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:35:y:2022:i:2:p:771-813.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rfs/hhab060
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Stefano Colonnello & Mariela Dal Borgo, 2024. "Raising Household Leverage: Evidence from Co-Financed Mortgages," Working Papers 2024: 01, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
    2. Amine Ouazad & Matthew E. Kahn, 2023. "Mortgage Securitization Dynamics in the Aftermath of Natural Disasters: A Reply," Papers 2305.07179, arXiv.org.
    3. Liu, Lu, 2023. "The demand for long-term mortgage contracts and the role of collateral," Bank of England working papers 1009, Bank of England.
    4. Liu, Lu, 2023. "The demand for long-term mortgage contracts and the role of collateral," ESRB Working Paper Series 142, European Systemic Risk Board.
    5. Kiana Basiri & Babak Mahmoudi & Chenggang Zhou, 2023. "Who benefits the most? Risk pooling in mortgage loan insurance: Evidence from the Canadian mortgage market," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 51(2), pages 311-337, March.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

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