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The Effect of Bank Supervision and Examination on Risk Taking: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

Author

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  • John Kandrac
  • Bernd Schlusche

Abstract

We exploit an exogenous reduction in bank supervision and examination to demonstrate a causal effect of supervisory oversight on financial institutions’ risk taking. The additional risk took the form of risky lending, faster asset growth, and a greater reliance on low-quality capital. This response to less oversight boosted banks’ odds of failure. Lastly, we show that the reduction in oversight capacity led to more costly failures because there were longer delays in closing insolvent institutions, and because more bad assets were passed to the government insurance fund.

Suggested Citation

  • John Kandrac & Bernd Schlusche, 2021. "The Effect of Bank Supervision and Examination on Risk Taking: Evidence from a Natural Experiment," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 34(6), pages 3181-3212.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:34:y:2021:i:6:p:3181-3212.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rfs/hhaa090
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Kok, Christoffer & Müller, Carola & Ongena, Steven & Pancaro, Cosimo, 2023. "The disciplining effect of supervisory scrutiny in the EU-wide stress test," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 53(C).
    2. Granja, João & Leuz, Christian, 2024. "The death of a regulator: Strict supervision, bank lending, and business activity," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 158(C).
    3. Ernaningsih, Indria & Smaoui, Houcem & Ben Salah, Ines, 2024. "Competition, regulation, and systemic risk in dual banking systems," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 93(PA), pages 1087-1103.
    4. Mircea Epure & Irina Mihai & Camelia Minoiu & José-Luis Peydró, 2024. "Global Financial Cycle, Household Credit, and Macroprudential Policies," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 70(11), pages 8096-8115, November.
    5. Francisco Serranito & Philipp RODERWEIS & Jamel Saadaoui, 2023. "Is Quantitative Easing Productive? The Role of Bank Lending in the Monetary Transmission Process," EconomiX Working Papers 2023-17, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    6. Chronopoulos, Dimitris K. & Wilson, John O.S. & Yilmaz, Muhammed H., 2023. "Regulatory oversight and bank risk," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    7. Anya Kleymenova & Rimmy E. Tomy, 2022. "Observing Enforcement: Evidence from Banking," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(4), pages 1583-1633, September.
    8. Hailey B. Ballew & Allison Nicoletti & Sarah B. Stuber, 2022. "The Effect of the Paycheck Protection Program and Financial Reporting Standards on Bank Risk-Taking," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(3), pages 2363-2371, March.
    9. Ivan T. Ivanov & Ben Ranish & James Wang, 2023. "Banks' Strategic Responses to Supervisory Coverage: Evidence from a Natural Experiment," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 55(2-3), pages 503-530, March.
    10. Biswas, Sonny & Koufopoulos, Kostas, 2022. "Bank capital structure and regulation: Overcoming and embracing adverse selection," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 143(3), pages 973-992.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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