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Credit and Punishment: Are Corporate Bankers Disciplined for Risk-Taking?

Author

Listed:
  • Janet Gao
  • Kristoph Kleiner
  • Joseph Pacelli
  • Itay Goldstein

Abstract

We examine whether bankers face disciplining consequences for structuring poorly performing corporate loans. We construct a novel data set containing the employment histories and loan portfolios of a large sample of corporate bankers and find that corporate credit events (i.e., downgrades, defaults, bankruptcies) increase banker turnover. The effect is pronounced when bankers issue loans with loose terms or experience severe losses. Credit events prompt bankers to adopt stricter future risk management practices, such as offering restrictive covenant packages. Overall, our findings are consistent with banks disciplining employees as a means to manage their own risk exposure.

Suggested Citation

  • Janet Gao & Kristoph Kleiner & Joseph Pacelli & Itay Goldstein, 2020. "Credit and Punishment: Are Corporate Bankers Disciplined for Risk-Taking?," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 33(12), pages 5706-5749.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:33:y:2020:i:12:p:5706-5749.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rfs/hhaa046
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Dagostino, Ramona & Gao, Janet & Ma, Pengfei, 2023. "Partisanship in loan pricing," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 150(3).
    2. Christensen, Hans B. & Macciocchi, Daniele & Morris, Arthur & Nikolaev, Valeri V., 2022. "Financial shocks to lenders and the composition of financial covenants," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(1).
    3. Carvalho, Daniel & Gao, Janet & Ma, Pengfei, 2023. "Loan spreads and credit cycles: The role of lenders’ personal economic experiences," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 118-149.
    4. Bunkanwanicha, Pramuan & Di Giuli, Alberta & Salvade, Federica, 2022. "Bank CEO careers after bailouts: The effects of management turnover on bank risk," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • J63 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs

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