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The Role of Government in Firm Outcomes

Author

Listed:
  • Ran Duchin
  • Zhenyu Gao
  • Haibing Shu
  • David Denis

Abstract

Using a unique setting in China, where the geographic distance between collective firms and local governments is highly persistent because of legal restrictions on land ownership and mobility, we investigate the role of government involvement in small firms. In our analysis of survey responses, we find that weaker government involvement, measured by greater distance from government, is associated with higher firm autonomy and reduced taxes, protectionism, and anticompetitive behavior. In our analysis of firm-level financial data, we find that distant firms have better operating performance, higher growth, and higher entry rates. We find similar results around exogenous government office relocations.

Suggested Citation

  • Ran Duchin & Zhenyu Gao & Haibing Shu & David Denis, 2020. "The Role of Government in Firm Outcomes," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 33(12), pages 5555-5593.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:33:y:2020:i:12:p:5555-5593.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rfs/hhaa005
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Yujing Huang & Xiujuan Li & Minggui Yu, 2024. "Assessment of local officials and government‐initiated CSR: Evidence from targeted poverty alleviation in China," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(1), pages 557-579, March.
    2. Wang, Yatong & Qiao, Zhi & Jin, Liang, 2023. "Government involvements and earnings management," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 55(PA).
    3. Figueroa, Camila & Iberti, Gonzalo & Riutort, Julio & Wagner, Rodrigo, 2023. "Do firms that state they are financially constrained tend to reinvest more of their profits?," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    4. Xiang, Junyi & Zhang, Hongxiang & Dang, Dingyu & Guan, Jing, 2023. "Involuntary political connections and private firms' tax avoidance," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    5. Lu, Shengfeng & Sun, Yukun & Tian, Hui & Zhao, Yan, 2024. "Geographical proximity to government and corporate litigation behavior: Evidence from China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
    6. Wang, Xun & Yu, Jingwen, 2023. "COVID-19 pandemic and corporate liquidity: The role of SOEs’ trade credit response," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 137(C).
    7. Xiao, Gang & Shen, Sichen, 2022. "To pollute or not to pollute: Political connections and corporate environmental performance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    8. Xiumei Liu & Fangbo Si & Chenxin Xie & Lu Xie, 2024. "Minority state ownership and firm performance: Evidence from the Chinese stock market crash in 2015," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 53(2), pages 291-325, June.
    9. Xiang, Junyi & Zhu, Ling & Kong, Dongmin, 2023. "Labor cost and corporate tax avoidance," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 205(C), pages 338-358.
    10. Zhaohua Li & Xiaofei Pan, 2023. "Relationship investment and local corruption environment: Evidence from China," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 63(4), pages 4597-4628, December.
    11. Qiankun Gu & Jeong‐Bon Kim & Ke Liao & Yi Si, 2023. "Decentralising for local information? Evidence from state‐owned listed firms in China," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 63(5), pages 5245-5276, December.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights

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