IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/rfinst/v33y2020i10p4445-4488..html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Deadlock on the Board

Author

Listed:
  • Jason Roderick Donaldson
  • Nadya Malenko
  • Giorgia Piacentino
  • Itay Goldstein

Abstract

We develop a dynamic model of board decision-making akin to dynamic voting models in the political economy literature. We show a board could retain a policy all directors agree is worse than an available alternative. Thus, directors may retain a CEO they agree is bad—deadlocked boards lead to entrenched CEOs. We explore how to compose boards and appoint directors to mitigate deadlock. We find board diversity and long director tenure can exacerbate deadlock. We rationalize why CEOs and incumbent directors have power to appoint new directors: to avoid deadlock. Our model speaks to short-termism, staggered boards, and proxy access.

Suggested Citation

  • Jason Roderick Donaldson & Nadya Malenko & Giorgia Piacentino & Itay Goldstein, 2020. "Deadlock on the Board," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 33(10), pages 4445-4488.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:33:y:2020:i:10:p:4445-4488.
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rfs/hhaa006
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Pierre Chaigneau & Nicolas Sahuguet, 2023. "The Complementarity Between Signal Informativeness and Monitoring," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(1), pages 141-185, March.
    2. Sun, Xiaotong & Stasinakis, Charalampos & Sermpinis, Georgios, 2024. "Decentralization illusion in Decentralized Finance: Evidence from tokenized voting in MakerDAO polls," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    3. Fos, Vyacheslav & Kempf, Elisabeth & Tsoutsoura, Margarita, 2021. "The Political Polarization of Corporate America," Working Papers 313, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
    4. Marius Guenzel & Ulrike Malmendier, 2020. "Behavioral Corporate Finance: The Life Cycle of a CEO Career," NBER Working Papers 27635, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Malmendier, Ulrike M. & Guenzel, Marius, 2020. "Behavioral Corporate Finance: The Life Cycle of a CEO Career," CEPR Discussion Papers 15103, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Corum, Adrian Aycan, 2021. "Fighting Fire with Fire: Optimality of Value Destruction to Mitigate Short-Termism," OSF Preprints xhwmg, Center for Open Science.
    7. Breuer, Matthias & Cai, Wei & Le, Anthony & Vetter, Felix, 2024. "Minority representation at work," Working Papers 343, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:33:y:2020:i:10:p:4445-4488.. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/sfsssea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.