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Corporate Deleveraging and Financial Flexibility

Author

Listed:
  • Harry DeAngelo
  • Andrei S Gonçalves
  • René M Stulz

Abstract

Most firms deleverage from their historical peak market-leverage (ML) ratios to near-zero ML, while also markedly increasing cash balances to high levels. Among 4,476 nonfinancial firms with five or more years of post-peak data, median ML is 0.543 at the peak and 0.026 at the later trough, with a six-year median time from peak to trough and with debt repayment and earnings retention accounting for 93.7% of the median peak-to-trough decline in ML. The findings support theories in which firms deleverage to restore ample financial flexibility and are difficult to reconcile with most firms having materially positive leverage targets. Received November 17, 2016; editorial decision November 9, 2017 by Editor David Denis. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web Site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Suggested Citation

  • Harry DeAngelo & Andrei S Gonçalves & René M Stulz, 2018. "Corporate Deleveraging and Financial Flexibility," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 31(8), pages 3122-3174.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:31:y:2018:i:8:p:3122-3174.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rfs/hhx147
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    JEL classification:

    • G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
    • G35 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Payout Policy

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