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The Retention Effects of Unvested Equity: Evidence from Accelerated Option Vesting

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  • Torsten Jochem
  • Tomislav Ladika
  • Zacharias Sautner

Abstract

We document that firms can effectively retain executives by granting deferred equity pay. We show this by analyzing a unique regulatory change (FAS 123-R) that prompted 723 firms to suddenly eliminate stock option vesting periods. This allowed CEOs to keep 33% more options when departing the firm, and we find that voluntary CEO departure rates subsequently rose from 5% to 21%. Our identification strategy exploits FAS 123-R’s almost-random timing, which was staggered by firms’ fiscal year-ends. Firms that experienced departures suffered negative stock price reactions, and responded by increasing compensation for remaining and newly hired executives.Received June 6, 2016; editorial decision October 10, 2017 by Editor Andrew Karolyi. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

Suggested Citation

  • Torsten Jochem & Tomislav Ladika & Zacharias Sautner, 2018. "The Retention Effects of Unvested Equity: Evidence from Accelerated Option Vesting," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 31(11), pages 4142-4186.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:31:y:2018:i:11:p:4142-4186.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rfs/hhy017
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    Cited by:

    1. Jenter, Dirk & Cziraki, Peter, 2021. "The Market for CEOs," CEPR Discussion Papers 16281, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Vojislav Maksimovic & Gordon Phillips & Liu Yang, 2023. "Do IPO Firms Become Myopic?," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 27(3), pages 765-807.
    3. Qilong Cao & Meng Ju & Jinglei Li & Changbao Zhong, 2022. "Managerial Myopia and Long-Term Investment: Evidence from China," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(1), pages 1-20, December.
    4. Alex Edmans & Luis Goncalves-Pinto & Moqi Groen-Xu & Yanbo Wang, 2018. "Strategic News Releases in Equity Vesting Months," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 31(11), pages 4099-4141.
    5. Vladimirov, Vladimir, 2021. "Financing Skilled Labor," CEPR Discussion Papers 15751, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Keusch, Thomas, 2021. "Shareholder Activists and Frictions in the CEO Labor Market," LawFin Working Paper Series 19, Goethe University, Center for Advanced Studies on the Foundations of Law and Finance (LawFin).
    7. Edmans, Alex & Gosling, Tom & Jenter, Dirk, 2023. "CEO compensation: Evidence from the field," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 150(3).
    8. Zhaozhen Zhu & Yijia Guo & Zhao Jiang & Xiaojun Chen, 2023. "The Perspective of Long-Term and Short-Term Incentives on the Business Environment, Executive Incentive Contracts, and Enterprise Innovation," SAGE Open, , vol. 13(4), pages 21582440231, November.
    9. Alex Edmans & Vivian W. Fang & Allen H. Huang, 2022. "The Long‐Term Consequences of Short‐Term Incentives," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(3), pages 1007-1046, June.
    10. Zuomiao Xie & Shiqi Yuan & Jinjing Zhu & Alistair Palferman, 2023. "Dynamic value sharing based on employee contribution as a competitiveness-enhancing device," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 10(1), pages 1-13, December.
    11. Liu, Baohua & Zhang, Nihui & Chan, Kam C. & Chen, Yining & Qiu, Xuemei, 2024. "Executive equity incentive plans: Effective golden handcuffs?," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 83-97.
    12. Xuejing Xie & Weiguo Zhang, 2023. "Should More Internally Generated Intangible Assets Be Recognized? A Commentary," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 59(1), pages 6-31, March.
    13. Martin Nienhaus, 2022. "Executive equity incentives and opportunistic manager behavior: new evidence from a quasi-natural experiment," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 27(4), pages 1276-1318, December.
    14. Fu, Xudong & Huang, Minjie & Tang, Tian, 2022. "Duration of executive compensation and maturity structure of corporate debt," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    15. Eva Labro & James D. Omartian, 2023. "Managing Employee Retention Concerns: Evidence from U.S. Census Data," Working Papers 23-07, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau.
    16. Cronqvist, Henrik & Ladika, Tomislav & Pazaj, Elisa & Sautner, Zacharias, 2024. "Limited attention to detail in financial markets: Evidence from reduced-form and structural estimation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 154(C).

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