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Pension Fund Asset Allocation and Liability Discount Rates

Author

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  • Aleksandar Andonov
  • Rob M.M.J. Bauer
  • K.J. Martijn Cremers

Abstract

The unique regulation of U.S. public pension funds links their liability discount rate to the expected return on assets, which gives them incentives to invest more in risky assets in order to report a better funding status. Comparing public and private pension funds in the United States, Canada, and Europe, we find that U.S. public pension funds act on their regulatory incentives. U.S. public pension funds with a higher level of underfunding per participant, as well as funds with more politicians and elected plan participants serving on the board, take more risk and use higher discount rates. The increased risk-taking by U.S. public funds is negatively related to their performance.Received May 16, 2014; editorial decision November 15, 2016 by Editor Andrew Karolyi.

Suggested Citation

  • Aleksandar Andonov & Rob M.M.J. Bauer & K.J. Martijn Cremers, 2017. "Pension Fund Asset Allocation and Liability Discount Rates," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 30(8), pages 2555-2595.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:30:y:2017:i:8:p:2555-2595.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rfs/hhx020
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