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Editor's Choice The Labor Market for Bankers and Regulators

Author

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  • Philip Bond
  • Vincent Glode

Abstract

We propose a labor market model in which agents with heterogenous ability levels choose to work as bankers or as financial regulators. When workers extract intrinsic benefits from working in regulation (such as public-sector motivation or human capital accumulation), our model jointly predicts that bankers are, on average, more skilled than regulators and their compensation is more sensitive to performance. During financial booms, banks draw the best workers away from the regulatory sector and misbehavior increases. In a dynamic extension of our model, young regulators accumulate human capital and the best ones switch to banking in mid-career.

Suggested Citation

  • Philip Bond & Vincent Glode, 2014. "Editor's Choice The Labor Market for Bankers and Regulators," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 27(9), pages 2539-2579.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:27:y:2014:i:9:p:2539-2579.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rfs/hht132
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Arnold, Lutz G. & Zelzner, Sebastian, 2022. "Financial trading versus entrepreneurship: Competition for talent and negative feedback effects," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 186-199.
    2. Ms. Deniz O Igan & Thomas Lambert, 2019. "Bank Lobbying: Regulatory Capture and Beyond," IMF Working Papers 2019/171, International Monetary Fund.
    3. Kempf, Elisabeth, 2017. "The Job Rating Game: The Effects of Revolving Doors on Analyst Incentives," Working Papers 258, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
    4. Cornaggia, Jess & Cornaggia, Kimberly J. & Xia, Han, 2016. "Revolving doors on Wall Street," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 400-419.
    5. Valasek, Justin, 2018. "Dynamic reform of public institutions: A model of motivated agents and collective reputation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 94-108.
    6. Alessandro De Chiara & Marco A. Schwarz, 2020. "A Dynamic Theory of Regulatory Capture," Working Papers 2020-12, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
    7. Wei, Jianxing & Xu, Tong, 2024. "Banking supervision with loopholes," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 161(C).
    8. Song, Fenghua & Thakor, Anjan, 2022. "Ethics, capital and talent competition in banking," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).
    9. Ferreira, Daniel & Nikolowa, Radoslawa, 2024. "Prestige, promotion, and pay," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 118369, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    10. Dongmin Kong & Junyi Xiang & Jian Zhang & Yiyang Lu, 2019. "Politically connected independent directors and corporate fraud in China," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 58(5), pages 1347-1383, March.
    11. De Chiara, Alessandro & Manna, Ester, 2022. "Firms' ownership, employees’ altruism, and product market competition," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
    12. Axel Wieneke, 2016. "Better Financial Innovation via Innovative Finance of Supervisors," Economic Papers, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 35(1), pages 16-23, March.
    13. Barbosa, Klenio & Straub, Stéphane, 2017. "The Value of Revolving Doors in Public Procurement," TSE Working Papers 17-873, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised May 2020.

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