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Informational Holdup and Performance Persistence in Venture Capital

Author

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  • Yael V. Hochberg
  • Alexander Ljungqvist
  • Annette Vissing-Jørgensen

Abstract

Why don't VCs eliminate excess demand for follow-on funds by raising fees? We propose a model of learning that leads to informational holdup. Current investors learn about skill whereas outside investors observe only returns. This gives current investors holdup power when the VC raises his next fund: Without their backing, no-one will fund him, as outside investors interpret the lack of backing as a sign of low skill. Holdup power diminishes the VC's ability to increase fees in line with performance, leading to return persistence. Empirical evidence supports the model. We estimate that up to two-thirds of VC firms lack skill. The Author 2013. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com., Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Yael V. Hochberg & Alexander Ljungqvist & Annette Vissing-Jørgensen, 2014. "Informational Holdup and Performance Persistence in Venture Capital," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 27(1), pages 102-152, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:27:y:2014:i:1:p:102-152
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rfs/hht046
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