IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/rfinst/v27y2014i12p3593-3627..html
   My bibliography  Save this article

What Happens in Nevada? Self-Selecting into Lax Law

Author

Listed:
  • Michal Barzuza
  • David C. Smith

Abstract

We find that Nevada, the second most popular state for out-of-state incorporations and a state with lax corporate law, attracts firms that are 30–40% more likely to report financial results that later require restatement than firms incorporated in other states, including Delaware. Our results suggest that firms favoring protections for insiders select Nevada as a corporate home, and these firms are prone to financial reporting failures. We provide some evidence that Nevada law also has a causal impact by increasing a Nevada firm's propensity to misreport financials after the firm has incorporated in Nevada.

Suggested Citation

  • Michal Barzuza & David C. Smith, 2014. "What Happens in Nevada? Self-Selecting into Lax Law," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 27(12), pages 3593-3627.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:27:y:2014:i:12:p:3593-3627.
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rfs/hhu058
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Sarfraz Khan & John K. Wald, 2015. "Director Liability Protection, Earnings Management, and Audit Pricing," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 12(4), pages 781-814, December.
    2. Robinson Reyes-Peña & Arun Upadhyay & Arun Kumaraswamy, 2023. "Foreign competitive pressure and inversions by U.S. multinational enterprises," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 54(5), pages 829-851, July.
    3. Calluzzo, Paul & Wang, Wei & Wu, Serena, 2021. "SEC scrutiny shopping," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    4. Guernsey, Scott & Sepe, Simone M. & Serfling, Matthew, 2022. "Blood in the water: The value of antitakeover provisions during market shocks," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 143(3), pages 1070-1096.
    5. Guan, Yuyan & Zhang, Liandong & Zheng, Liu & Zou, Hong, 2021. "Managerial liability and corporate innovation: Evidence from a legal shock," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    6. Bruce G. Carruthers & Naomi R. Lamoreaux, 2016. "Regulatory Races: The Effects of Jurisdictional Competition on Regulatory Standards," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(1), pages 52-97, March.
    7. Stefano Colonnello & Christoph Herpfer, 2021. "Do Courts Matter for Firm Value? Evidence from the US Court System," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64(2), pages 403-438.
    8. Gilson, Ronald J. & Schwartz, Alan, 2015. "Corporate control and credible commitment," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 119-130.
    9. Stef, Nicolae & Dimelis, Sophia, 2020. "Bankruptcy regime and the banking system," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 480-495.
    10. Dissanaike, Gishan & Drobetz, Wolfgang & Momtaz, Paul P. & Rocholl, Jörg, 2021. "The Economics of Law Enforcement: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Corporate Takeover Law," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    11. Lukas, Moritz & Nöth, Markus, 2016. "Commitment and Borrower Heterogeneity: Evidence from Revolving Consumer Credit," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145870, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:27:y:2014:i:12:p:3593-3627.. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/sfsssea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.