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Termination Risk, Multiple Managers and Mutual Fund Tournaments

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  • Jiaping Qiu

Abstract

This study analyzes the risk-taking behavior of mutual funds in response to their relative performance over the 1992 to 1999 period. Our results show that managers of funds whose performance is closer to that of the top performing funds have greater incentives to increase their portfolios' risk than managers at the top who exhibit a tendency to lock in their positions. The evidence suggests that termination risk imposes a constraint on the risk taking behavior of underperforming fund managers and the winner takes all phenomenon generates a strong incentive for the fund managers to be the top manager. We also analyze the difference in the risk taking behavior of funds managed by multiple managers and single managers. JEL Classification codes: G2 L2

Suggested Citation

  • Jiaping Qiu, 2003. "Termination Risk, Multiple Managers and Mutual Fund Tournaments," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 7(2), pages 161-190.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:revfin:v:7:y:2003:i:2:p:161-190.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1023/A:1024533132105
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    Cited by:

    1. Basak, Suleyman & Makarov, Dmitry, 2012. "Difference in interim performance and risk taking with short-sale constraints," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(2), pages 377-392.
    2. Benjamin Sahel & Antonio Scalia & Luana Zaccaria, 2021. "Career concerns and peer effects in institutional tournaments: Evidence from ECB reserve currency portfolios," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 50(1), pages 47-73, March.
    3. Alexander Kempf & Stefan Ruenzi, 2008. "Tournaments in Mutual-Fund Families," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 21(2), pages 1013-1036, April.
    4. Kempf, Alexander & Ruenzi, Stefan & Thiele, Tanja, 2009. "Employment risk, compensation incentives, and managerial risk taking: Evidence from the mutual fund industry," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(1), pages 92-108, April.
    5. Zhao, Lu & Wang, Liang & Luo, Ronghua, 2024. "Mutual fund tournaments: State-dependent risk taking with transaction costs," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 59(C).
    6. Loukas Balafoutas & E. Glenn Dutcher & Florian Lindner & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2017. "The Optimal Allocation Of Prizes In Tournaments Of Heterogeneous Agents," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(1), pages 461-478, January.
    7. Cvitanic, Jaksa & Lazrak, Ali & Wang, Tan, 2008. "Implications of the Sharpe ratio as a performance measure in multi-period settings," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 32(5), pages 1622-1649, May.
    8. Aramonte, Sirio & Szerszeń, Paweł J., 2020. "Cross-market liquidity and dealer profitability: Evidence from the bond and CDS markets," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 51(C).
    9. Ryan, Ellen, 2022. "Are fund managers rewarded for taking cyclical risks?," Working Paper Series 2652, European Central Bank.
    10. Spiegel, Matthew & Zhang, Hong, 2013. "Mutual fund risk and market share-adjusted fund flows," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(2), pages 506-528.
    11. Fang, Dawei & Holmén, Martin & Kleinlercher, Daniel & Kirchler, Michael, 2017. "How tournament incentives affect asset markets: A comparison between winner-take-all tournaments and elimination contests," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 1-27.
    12. Debapriya Jojo Paul & Julia Henker & Sian Owen, 2019. "The aggregate impacts of tournament incentives in experimental asset markets," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 22(2), pages 441-476, June.
    13. Karagiannidis, Iordanis, 2010. "Management team structure and mutual fund performance," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 197-211, April.
    14. Michaela Bär & Alexander Kempf & Stefan Ruenzi, 2010. "Is a Team Different from the Sum of its Parts? Evidence from Mutual Fund Managers," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 15(2), pages 359-396.
    15. Ryan, Ellen, 2024. "Are fund managers rewarded for taking cyclical risks?," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    16. Buzzacchi, Luigi & Scellato, Giuseppe & Ughetto, Elisa, 2015. "Investment stage drifts and venture capital managerial incentives," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 118-128.
    17. Sirio Aramonte & Seung Jung Lee & Viktors Stebunovs, 2015. "Risk Taking and Low Longer-term Interest Rates: Evidence from the U.S. Syndicated Loan Market," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2015-68, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    18. Suleyman Basak & Dmitry Makarov, 2014. "Strategic Asset Allocation in Money Management," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 69(1), pages 179-217, February.
    19. Karagiannidis, Iordanis, 2012. "The effect of management team characteristics on risk-taking and style extremity of mutual fund portfolios," Review of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 153-158.
    20. Cici, Gjergji, 2011. "The relation of the disposition effect to mutual fund trades and performance," CFR Working Papers 11-05, University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR).
    21. Iordanis Karagiannidis, 2012. "The effect of management team characteristics on risk‐taking and style extremity of mutual fund portfolios," Review of Financial Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 21(3), pages 153-158, September.
    22. Ryan, Ellen, 2022. "Are fund managers rewarded for taking cyclical risks?," ESRB Working Paper Series 134, European Systemic Risk Board.
    23. Caginalp, Gunduz & Ho, Shirley J., 2018. "Does competition inhibit fairness and altruism?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 54-64.
    24. Ha, Yeonjeong & Ko, Kwangsoo, 2017. "Why do fund managers increase risk?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 108-116.
    25. Chia-Ying Chan & Christine W. Lai & Liang-Chung Lee, 2017. "Strategic Choice of Risk: Evidence from Mutual Fund Families," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 51(1), pages 125-163, February.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
    • L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior

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