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How do corporate tax hikes affect investment allocation within multinationals?

Author

Listed:
  • Antonio De Vito
  • Martin Jacob
  • Dirk Schindler
  • Guosong Xu

Abstract

This article studies how corporate tax hikes transmit across countries through multinationals’ internal networks of subsidiaries. We build a parsimonious multicountry model to highlight two opposing spillover effects: while tax competition between countries generates positive investment spillover, intra-firm production linkages predict negative spillover. Using subsidiary-level data and exogenous corporate tax hikes, we find that local business units cut investment by 0.5 percent for a 1 percent increase in foreign corporate tax. This result highlights the importance of production linkages in propagating foreign tax shocks, as the supply-chain-induced negative spillover dominates the positive spillover effect suggested by the conventional wisdom of tax competition.

Suggested Citation

  • Antonio De Vito & Martin Jacob & Dirk Schindler & Guosong Xu, 2025. "How do corporate tax hikes affect investment allocation within multinationals?," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 29(2), pages 531-565.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:revfin:v:29:y:2025:i:2:p:531-565.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rof/rfaf006
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    tax hike; investment; internal networks; multinationals; spillover effects;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D20 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - General
    • D25 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Intertemporal Firm Choice: Investment, Capacity, and Financing
    • H32 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Firm
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

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