IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/revfin/v23y2019i1p199-243..html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Can Socially Responsible Firms Survive Competition? An Analysis of Corporate Employee Matching Grant Schemes

Author

Listed:
  • Ning Gong
  • Bruce D Grundy

Abstract

Employee matching grant schemes are coordination mechanisms that reduce free-riding by socially conscious employee-donors. Matching schemes coupled with lower take-home pay than offered by non-matching firms will survive capital and labor market competition if employee type is not observable and socially conscious employees are more productive or value working together. Matching can enhance employee welfare and raise more for charity without reducing profits. We document that matching firms have higher labor productivity and are more likely to be ranked as one of the “100 Best” employers. The result is robust to managerial entrenchment concerns and is not confined to the high-tech sector.

Suggested Citation

  • Ning Gong & Bruce D Grundy, 2019. "Can Socially Responsible Firms Survive Competition? An Analysis of Corporate Employee Matching Grant Schemes," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 23(1), pages 199-243.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:revfin:v:23:y:2019:i:1:p:199-243.
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rof/rfx025
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Shackleton, Mark & Yan, Jiali & Yao, Yaqiong, 2022. "What drives a firm's ES performance? Evidence from stock returns," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 136(C).
    2. You, Linqing & Chen, Zhuoqiong, 2022. "A theory of firm opacity and corporate social responsibility," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 145(C).
    3. Dunbar, Craig & Li, Zhichuan (Frank) & Shi, Yaqi, 2020. "CEO risk-taking incentives and corporate social responsibility," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    4. Jiangyuan Hou & Yanping Wang & Mingyue Du, 2023. "Friend or Foe: How Do Consumers and Producers Affect the ESG Rating Index? Evidence from China’s Market of Organic Milk," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(14), pages 1-17, July.
    5. Hooi Hooi Lean & Fabio Pizzutilo, 2021. "Performances and risk of socially responsible investments across regions during crisis," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(3), pages 3556-3568, July.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Employee matching grants; Corporate social responsibility;

    JEL classification:

    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • L31 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs; Social Entrepreneurship

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:revfin:v:23:y:2019:i:1:p:199-243.. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/eufaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.