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Informed Headquarters and Socialistic Internal Capital Markets

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  • Daniel Hoang
  • Martin Ruckes

Abstract

This article develops a theory of resource allocation in internal capital markets that is consistent with the empirical finding that multidivision firms bias their investment levels in favor of divisions with weaker investment prospects. Headquarters has private information about the capital productivities of its divisions; therefore, capital allocations in the present serve as a signal to divisional managers about future allocations. To facilitate effort provision, headquarters biases capital allocation so as to not disclose productivity differences across divisions or to credibly signal their absence. The capital allocation bias is time-varying and the relationship between the bias and the difference in average division productivities is inversely U-shaped.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Hoang & Martin Ruckes, 2015. "Informed Headquarters and Socialistic Internal Capital Markets," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 19(3), pages 1105-1141.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:revfin:v:19:y:2015:i:3:p:1105-1141.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rof/rfu018
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    Cited by:

    1. Qian, Xuesong & Kong, Dongmin & Du, Li, 2019. "Proximity, information, and loan pricing in internal capital markets: Evidence from China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 434-456.
    2. Hoang, Daniel & Gatzer, Sebastian & Ruckes, Martin E., 2018. "The economics of capital allocation in firms: Evidence from internal capital markets," Working Paper Series in Economics 115, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management.
    3. Benz, Andreas & Demerjian, Peter R. & Hoang, Daniel & Ruckes, Martin E., 2024. "Picking winners: Managerial ability and capital allocation," Working Paper Series in Economics 163, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management.
    4. John R. Busenbark & Matthew Semadeni & Mathias Arrfelt & Michael C. Withers, 2022. "Corporate‐level influences on internal capital allocation: The role of financial analyst performance projections," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(1), pages 180-209, January.
    5. Gatzer, Sebastian & Hoang, Daniel & Ruckes, Martin, 2015. "Internal Capital Markets and Diversified Firms: Theory and Practice," EconStor Preprints 169432, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.

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