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Why Do Firms Pay Dividends?: Evidence from an Early and Unregulated Capital Market

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  • John D. Turner
  • Qing Ye
  • Wenwen Zhan

Abstract

Why do firms pay dividends? To answer this question, we use a hand-collected data set of companies traded on the London stock market between 1825 and 1870. As tax rates were effectively zero, the capital market was unregulated, and there were no institutional stockholders, we can rule out these potential determinants ex ante. We find that, even though they were legal, share repurchases were not used by firms to return cash to shareholders. Instead, our evidence provides support for the information--communication explanation for dividends, while providing little support for agency, illiquidity, catering, or behavioral explanations. Copyright 2013, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • John D. Turner & Qing Ye & Wenwen Zhan, 2013. "Why Do Firms Pay Dividends?: Evidence from an Early and Unregulated Capital Market," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 17(5), pages 1787-1826.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:revfin:v:17:y:2013:i:5:p:1787-1826
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rof/rfs048
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    Cited by:

    1. Mark Mietzner, 2017. "Why do firms decide to stop their share repurchase programs?," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 815-855, October.
    2. Turner, John D., 2014. "Financial history and financial economics," QUCEH Working Paper Series 14-03, Queen's University Belfast, Queen's University Centre for Economic History.
    3. Sheikh, Shahbaz, 2022. "CEO power and the likelihood of paying dividends: Effect of profitability and cash flow volatility," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    4. Gareth Campbell & Áine Gallagher & Richard S. Grossman, 2024. "Living La Vida Loca? Remote Investing in Latin America, 1869-1929," CESifo Working Paper Series 11562, CESifo.
    5. Kathryn E. Easterday & Pradyot K. Sen, 2023. "Another look at the dividend-price relationship in the accounting valuation framework," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 61(3), pages 879-925, October.
    6. Gareth Campbell & John D. Turner & Qing Ye, 2018. "The liquidity of the London capital markets, 1825–70†," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 71(3), pages 823-852, August.
    7. Enrico Onali, 2014. "Moral Hazard, Dividends, and Risk in Banks," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(1-2), pages 128-155, January.
    8. Thaer Alhalabi & Vítor Castro & Justine Wood, 2023. "Bank dividend payout policy and debt seniority: Evidence from US Banks," Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 32(5), pages 285-340, December.
    9. Ye, Qing & Turner, John D., 2014. "The cross-section of stock returns in an early stock market," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 114-123.
    10. Moortgat, Leentje & Annaert, Jan & Deloof, Marc, 2017. "Investor protection, taxation and dividend policy: Long-run evidence, 1838–2012," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 113-131.
    11. Liang, Shangkun & Niu, Yuhao & Yang, Dan & Liu, Xuejuan, 2023. "Dividend payouts under a societal crisis: Financial constraints or signaling?," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 88(C).
    12. Gram, Dennis & Karapanagiotis, Pantelis & Krzyzanowski, Jan & Liebald, Marius & Walz, Uwe, 2021. "An extensible model for historical financial data with an application to German company and stock market data," SAFE Working Paper Series 300, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    13. Trinh, Vu Quang & Kara, Alper & Elnahass, Marwa, 2022. "Dividend payout strategies and bank survival likelihood: A cross-country analysis," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    14. Graeme G. Acheson & Gareth Campbell & John D. Turner, 2017. "Who financed the expansion of the equity market? Shareholder clienteles in Victorian Britain," Business History, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 59(4), pages 607-637, May.
    15. Chronopoulos, Dimitris K. & Johari, Edie Erman Che & Scholtens, Bert & Sobiech, Anna L. & Wilson, John O.S. & Yilmaz, Muhammed H., 2023. "Competition and bank dividends," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 137(C).
    16. Campbell, Gareth & Quinn, William & Turner, John D. & Ye, Qing, 2015. "What moved share prices in the nineteenth-century London stock market?," QUCEH Working Paper Series 15-06, Queen's University Belfast, Queen's University Centre for Economic History.
    17. Turner, John D., 2024. "Three centuries of corporate governance in the UK," QUCEH Working Paper Series 24-01, Queen's University Belfast, Queen's University Centre for Economic History.
    18. Gareth Campbell & William Quinn & John D. Turner & Qing Ye, 2018. "What moved share prices in the nineteenth†century London stock market?," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 71(1), pages 157-189, February.
    19. Marc Deloof & Ine Paeleman, 2024. "International entrepreneurship without investor protection: Evidence from initial public offerings in Belgium before the First World War," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 77(2), pages 523-553, May.
    20. Leentje Moortgat & Jan Annaert & Marc Deloof, 2024. "The long-run persistence in dividend policy," Cliometrica, Springer;Cliometric Society (Association Francaise de Cliométrie), vol. 18(3), pages 621-651, September.
    21. Onali, Enrico & Galiakhmetova, Ramilya & Molyneux, Philip & Torluccio, Giuseppe, 2016. "CEO power, government monitoring, and bank dividends," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 89-117.

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