Monopoly without a Monopolist: An Economic Analysis of the Bitcoin Payment System
[Blockchain Economics]
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Keywords
Antitrust; Open Source; Market design; Queueing; Payment Systems; Cryptocurrency; Distributed Ledger;All these keywords.
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