A Framework for Dynamic Oligopoly in Concentrated Industries
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- Takeshi Fukasawa, 2023. "The Use of Symmetry for Models with Variable-size Variables," Papers 2311.08650, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2024.
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2109.01725, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2021.
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"Capital Buffers in a Quantitative Model of Banking Industry Dynamics,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(6), pages 2975-3023, November.
- Dean Corbae & Pablo D'Erasmo, 2021. "Capital Buffers in a Quantitative Model of Banking Industry Dynamics," Working Papers 779, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
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- Sears, Louis S. & Lawell, C.Y. Cynthia Lin & Torres, Gerald & Walter, M. Todd, 2022. "Moment-based Markov Equilibrium Estimation of High-Dimension Dynamic Games: An Application to Groundwater Management in California," 2022 Annual Meeting, July 31-August 2, Anaheim, California 322187, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
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Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(2), May.
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More about this item
Keywords
Dynamic oligopoly; Industry dynamics; Computation;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
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