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Information Projection: Model and Applications

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  • Kristóf Madarász

Abstract

People exaggerate the extent to which their information is shared with others. This paper introduces the concept of such information projection and provides a simple but widely applicable model. The key application describes a novel agency conflict in a frictionless learning environment. When monitoring with ex post information, biased evaluators exaggerate how much experts could have known ex ante and underestimate experts on average. Experts, to defend their reputations, are too eager to base predictions on ex ante information that substitutes for the information jurors independently learn ex post and too reluctant to base predictions on ex ante information that complements the information jurors independently learn ex post. Instruments that mitigate Bayesian agency conflicts are either ineffective or directly backfire. Applications to defensive medicine are discussed. Copyright , Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Kristóf Madarász, 2012. "Information Projection: Model and Applications," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 79(3), pages 961-985.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:79:y:2012:i:3:p:961-985
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/restud/rdr044
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ran Spiegler, 2016. "Bayesian Networks and Boundedly Rational Expectations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 131(3), pages 1243-1290.
    2. Philippe Jehiel, 2022. "Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibrium and Related Concepts:Theory, Applications, and Beyond," Working Papers halshs-03735680, HAL.
    3. Piotr Evdokimov & Umberto Garfagnini, 2023. "Cognitive Ability and Perceived Disagreement in Learning," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 381, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    4. Cheng, Ing-Haw & Hsiaw, Alice, 2022. "Distrust in experts and the origins of disagreement," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
    5. repec:cep:stitep:566 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Danz, David & Hüber, Frank & Kübler, Dorothea & Mechtenberg, Lydia & Schmid, Julia, 2013. "'I'll do it by myself as I knew it all along': On the failure of hindsight-biased principals to delegate optimally," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2013-203, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    7. Sebastian Fehrler & Baiba Renerte & Irenaeus Wolff, 2020. "Beliefs about Others: A Striking Example of Information Neglect," TWI Research Paper Series 118, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.
    8. repec:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2013-009 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Raymond J. Fisman & Rakesh Khurana & Matthew Rhodes-Kropf & Soojin Yim, 2014. "Governance and CEO Turnover: Do Something or Do the Right Thing?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 60(2), pages 319-337, February.
    10. Marco Serena, 2017. "A Belief-based Theory for Private Information Games," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2018-12, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
    11. Madarász, Kristóf, 2015. "Bargaining under the Illusion of Transparency," CEPR Discussion Papers 10327, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Kristóf Madarász, 2015. "Projection Equilibrium: Definition and Applications to Social Investment and Persuasion," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series /2015/566, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    13. Irlenbusch, Bernd & Ter Meer, Janna, 2013. "Fooling the Nice Guys: Explaining receiver credulity in a public good game with lying and punishment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 321-327.

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