On the Existence and Optimality of Competitive Equilibrium for a Slave Economy
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- P.J. Hammond, 2007.
"History: Sunk Cost, or Widespread Externality?,"
Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali, Vita e Pensiero, Pubblicazioni dell'Universita' Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, vol. 115(2), pages 161-185.
- Hammond, Peter J., 2007. "History: Sunk Cost, or Widespread Externality?," Economic Research Papers 269758, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
- Hammond, Peter J., 2007. "History : Sunk Cost, or Widespread Externality?," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 808, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Daron Acemoglu & Alexander Wolitzky, 2011.
"The Economics of Labor Coercion,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 79(2), pages 555-600, March.
- Daron Acemoglu & Alexander Wolitzky, 2009. "The Economics of Labor Coercion," NBER Working Papers 15581, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Sonnabend, Hendrik, 2015. "Good Intentions and Unintended Evil? Clients’ Punishment in the Market for Sex Services with Voluntary and Involuntary Providers," EconStor Preprints 110682, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
- Elvio Accinelli & Leobardo Plata & Joss Sánchez, 2011. "Changes in social welfare in an intertemporal economy," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 1611, Department of Economics - dECON.
- W D A Bryant, 2009. "General Equilibrium:Theory and Evidence," World Scientific Books, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., number 6875, August.
- Jonathan Conning, 2004. "The Causes of Slavery or Serfdom and the Roads to Agrarian Capitalism: Domar's Hypothesis Revisited," Economics Working Paper Archive at Hunter College 401, Hunter College Department of Economics.
- Michael Suk-Young Chwe, 1990. "Violence in Incentives: Pain in a Principal-Agent Model," Discussion Papers 871, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Lagerlöf, Nils-Petter, 2016. "Born free," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 1-10.
- Sonnabend, Hendrik & Stadtmann, Georg, 2018. "Good intentions and unintended evil? Adverse effects of criminalizing clients in paid sex markets with voluntary and involuntary prostitution," Discussion Papers 400, European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Department of Business Administration and Economics.
- Lagerlöf, Nils-Petter, 2003. "Slavery and other property rights," MPRA Paper 372, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 30 Aug 2006.
- Saito, Tetsuya, 2005. "Managerial Strategies of the Cotton South," MPRA Paper 181, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Aug 2006.
- Paul Oslington, 2012. "General Equilibrium: Theory and Evidence," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 88(282), pages 446-448, September.
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