IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/qjecon/v54y1940i3p455-473..html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Ownership and Compensation as Incentives to Corporation Executives

Author

Listed:
  • R. A. Gordon

Abstract

I. The problem, 455. — II. Sample and data: 149 out of 200 largest (1929) non-financial firms for which data are available, 457; basis for selecting executives for study, 457; sources and quality of data, 458. — III. Stockholdings: value and dividends, 460. — IV. Executive compensation, 465. — V. The various incentives compared, 466. — VI. Summary and conclusion, 470.

Suggested Citation

  • R. A. Gordon, 1940. "Ownership and Compensation as Incentives to Corporation Executives," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 54(3), pages 455-473.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:54:y:1940:i:3:p:455-473.
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/1882451
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Mike Burkart & Samuel Lee, 2008. "One Share - One Vote: the Theory," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 12(1), pages 1-49.
    2. Luca Fiorito, 2009. "The Institutionalists’ Reaction to Chamberlin’s 'Theory of Monopolistic Competition'," Department of Economics University of Siena 560, Department of Economics, University of Siena.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:54:y:1940:i:3:p:455-473.. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://academic.oup.com/qje .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.