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Stockholders' Voting Rights and the Centralization of Voting Control

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  • W. H. S. Stevens

Abstract

Restricted voting control comparatively recent, 353. — I. Non-voting industrial stocks. Preferred issues, 357. — Common stock, 360. — II. Contingent voting industrial stocks; their importance and characteristics, 362. — Non-voting contingent voting issues, 364. — Non-voting with exceptions — contingent voting, 364. Non-voting for directors — contingent voting, 366. — Full voting — contingent voting, 367. — III. Conditions which render operative the contingent voting rights. Dividend defaults, 367. — Other contingencies, 372. — IV. Extent of contingent voting control when operative. Exclusive voting, 374. — Extra voting, 375. — Full voting, 376. — Exclusive voting for directors, 377. — Contingent voting common shares, 378. — V. Railroad and public utility non-voting and contingent voting stocks: Utilities, 378; Railroads, 381. — VI. Arguments for and against non-voting stocks, 382. — Advisable to prohibit strictly non-voting issues, 385. — Ineffectiveness of full voting rights to prevent centralized voting control, 386. — VII. Conclusion. Advantages of strong contingent voting issues, 388.

Suggested Citation

  • W. H. S. Stevens, 1926. "Stockholders' Voting Rights and the Centralization of Voting Control," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 40(3), pages 353-392.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:40:y:1926:i:3:p:353-392.
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    Cited by:

    1. William H. Lazonick & Mary O'Sullivan, 1997. "Corporate Governance and Corporate Employment: Is Prosperity Sustainable in the United States?," Economics Working Paper Archive wp_183, Levy Economics Institute.
    2. Karpov, A., 2012. "Corporate Board Elections and Company's Performance," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 16(4), pages 10-25.

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