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American Corporations and Their Executives: A Statistical Inquiry

Author

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  • F. W. Taussig
  • W. S. Barker

Abstract

I. Subject and methods of the inquiry: Industries covered and questions asked, 1. — A pre-war period selected, 7. — Arrangement of the returns by classes and groups, 9. — II. Stock ownership by executives: Their salaries, 11. — Extent to which executives hold stock in large concerns, 12. — In moderate and small concerns, 14. — Stockholdings by relatives or friends of the executives, 18. — Executive salaries, by classes and groups, 19. — Fixity of salaries; only in the long run adjusted to corporate earnings, 20. — Proportion of management expense to capital, 23. — Proportion in close corporations and in those widely owned, 27. — Rarity of arrangements for bonus or profit-sharing, 28. — III. Earnings and surpluses, for all classes, 30. — For the first class, 33. — For the second class, 34. — Earnings in the first class more regular but less high, 35. — Dividends and surpluses, 37. — Significance of surplus, 39. — IV. The theory of profits: Contrast between American and European practice, 40. — Two views on theory: the one regarding business profits as a form of wages, the other as distinct from wages, 40. — American practice in accord with the second view, 42. — European practice, especially on the Continent, implies more nearly the first view: The tantième, 43. — The merits and demerits of the two practices, 48. — Conclusion, 59.

Suggested Citation

  • F. W. Taussig & W. S. Barker, 1925. "American Corporations and Their Executives: A Statistical Inquiry," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 40(1), pages 1-51.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:40:y:1925:i:1:p:1-51.
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    Cited by:

    1. Foreman-Peck, James & Hannah, Leslie, 2011. "Extreme Divorce: the Managerial Revolution in UK Companies before 1914," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2011/21, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
    2. Gregory E. Sierra & Eli Talmor & James S. Wallace, 2004. "A unified analysis of executive pay: the case of the banking industry," Supervisory Policy Analysis Working Papers 2004-02, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    3. Matović Ivana Marinović, 2019. "Comparative Analysis of Executive Compensation in the Republic of Serbia and EU Countries," Economic Themes, Sciendo, vol. 57(2), pages 181-200, June.
    4. Clifford G. Holderness & Randall S. Kroszner & Dennis P. Sheehan, 1998. "Were the Good Old Days That Good? Changes in Managerial Stock Ownership Since the Great Depression," NBER Working Papers 6550, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Carola Frydman & Raven E. Saks, 2010. "Executive Compensation: A New View from a Long-Term Perspective, 1936--2005," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 23(5), pages 2099-2138.
    6. Job Borrenbergs & Rui Vieira & Georgios Georgakopoulos, 2017. "Remuneration Committees’ Gender Composition as a Determinant of Executive Board Compensation Structure," International Business Research, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 10(2), pages 135-146, February.
    7. Lucie Courteau & Roberto Di Pietra & Paolo Giudici & Andrea Melis, 2017. "The role and effect of controlling shareholders in corporate governance," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 21(3), pages 561-572, September.

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